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Summary 
 
In March 2002, two trade problems in the bilateral relationship between Russia and the United 
States received unprecedented attention from politicians, journalists and analysts in the two 
countries:  
1. Russian steel export to the United States was affected by safeguard measures on steel 
import introduced by President George W. Bush.  
2. Russian veterinary authorities imposed a temporary import ban on American poultry. 
 
The trade problems quickly rose to a political level in the bilateral relationship, reflecting a 
lack of bilateral trade regulation. The press linked the two problems and called them a trade 
war on steel and poultry.  
 
In my thesis, I use these two trade problems as cases to analyse interaction between Russian 
state and business actors when they manage trade issues. I analyse state-business interaction 
from 1998 to late 2002 according to a network framework. In this framework, networks 
between state and business actors have six dimensions: actors, functions, structure, 
institutionalisation, power relations, and strategies of the public administration. The steel and 
poultry networks are first described and analysed through these six dimensions. Afterwards, 
they are discussed according to four models for state-business interaction that have recurred in 
the research debate: clans, loose networking patterns, state capture and elite exchange. Lastly, 
I explore factors that may influence network formation and change. Two factors are explored 
explicitly, as independent variables: the bilateral relations between Russia and the United 
States, and sector structure in the involved industries.  
 
In the research debate about interest mediation in Russia, the pattern of relations between state 
and business actors is a source of dispute. The question of which side has more autonomy and 
influence on the other is also a contested issue. In the steel case, I find that state and business 
actors have close and frequent contact, and that membership on the business side is restricted. 
In the poultry case, the state has substantial influence on access channels from the business 
side to state agencies. The business side, in return, acquires substantial influence on the 
domestic market. In both cases, the bilateral relationship influences developments in the 
networks. I also conclude that in the Russian system for interest mediation, networks are 
stable. This is an insiders’ system, where access to the state is for the privileged. 
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Introducing the subject of this study 
Under Vladimir Putin, economic interests have become more prominent in Russian 
foreign policy. The question of how economic interests affect Russian foreign policy is 
often discussed with an emphasis on the large oil and gas suppliers, like Gazprom or 
Lukoil (e.g., Donaldson and Nogee 2002: 172-175). Less attention is given to 
representatives of other industries. However, they also matter, but are rarely influential 
enough to be distinct foreign policy actors. In general, business actors rely on contacts 
and ties with state agencies to promote their interests. How such interaction shapes 
Russian domestic politics is a central topic in the research debate. It is less studied how 
interaction between state and business actors is influenced by and influences upon 
Russia’s foreign relations (Bukkvoll 2002 is one exception). This study focuses on a 
set of problems where foreign relations and domestic politics, and state and business 
actors meet: trade issues. 
1.2  The core question 
How do Russian state and business actors interact when managing trade issues? 
This study tries to answer the question through an analysis of two cases of state-
business interaction in Russia from 1998 to 2002. Both cases are trade issues that have 
to do with the United States. The first case concerns Russian steel production and 
export to the United States, while the second case concerns Russian poultry import 
from the United States.  
1.2.1  Empirical aim of the study 
In the debate about patterns of interaction between state and business actors in 
Russia, there are different opinions about the degree of separation between economic 
and political actors. For example, Thane Gustafson argues, “[t]he relationship between 
the state and the private sector is on the whole unpredictable and antagonistic” (1999: 
226). Richard E. Ericson formulates another common view when he refers to a 
“conflation of economic and political actors and agents” (2001: 254). Likewise, 
analysts discuss the extent of state autonomy towards business. Lilia Shevtsova holds 
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that under Putin, “[t]he regime achieved its goal of getting all the industrialists and 
oligarchs in one place and under its control” (2003: 180). Similarly, Peter Rutland 
argues, “[b]usinesses compete for individual favors from state agencies and are 
constantly fearful that their privileges might be revoked” (2001: 26). Other observers 
maintain that the state is the weak side of the relationship, and that it is faced with 
strong business interests: “(…) the political system is presently too weak to be an 
effective partner to Russia’s new capitalism (…). The present social revolution in 
Russia is unusual in modern experience, in that so far it is leading to a weaker state, 
not a stronger one” (Gustafson 1999: 233). 
On this background, the first aim in this study is empirical:  
(1) To describe how state and business actors interact in the two mentioned cases.  
1.2.2  Theoretical aims of the study 
Different models have been proposed in the debate about state-business interaction. 
For example, some argue that there are influential state-business clans (Vorozheikina 
1994; Graham 1999: 329; Lane 2000; Wedel 2001; Rutland 2001). Barbara 
Lehmbruch takes a different view, and proposes that loose networking patterns 
connect state and business actors (1999, 2001). Others again have found that business 
interests have captured the state (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000). Timothy Frye 
argues that the state-business relationship is more like an elite exchange (Frye 2002). 
The second aim of this study is theoretical: 
(2a) To discuss whether some of these models are better suited than others to 
describe state-business interaction in the two cases.  
These models can be discussed and compared within the network framework. The 
network framework systematises the study of interaction between state and business 
actors. A network is defined as an enduring linkage pattern of interdependent 
politicians, bureaucrats and interest representatives (van Waarden 1992: 31). The 
network framework will be discussed in detail in chapter two.  
There is little coverage in the literature of how and why networks change. Many 
studies of network change and continuity in Russia focus on the transition from the 
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Soviet to the post-Soviet period (Vorozheikina 1994; Kharkhordin and Gerber 1994; 
Sapir 1996). More current studies often focus on general elite change and elite 
backgrounds (e.g., Kryshtanovskaya and White 2003). Additionally, networks are seen 
as influenced by domestic politics only (e.g., Kjellberg and Reitan 1995). In trade 
issues, and in the context of foreign relations in general, this appears as a shortcoming. 
Therefore, the last theoretical aim of this study is 
(2b) to explore factors that may explain how networks are formed and change. Do 
relations with other countries influence domestic networks? 
1.3  Research design 
1.3.1  The analytical framework 
Management of trade issue includes responding to external and internal actions and 
challenges during and in-between periods of bilateral contact. This is very much a two-
level game (Putnam 1988), and it is an indispensable part of the foreign relations of 
any country. For this reason, trade issues are worthwhile for studying the intersection 
of foreign and domestic policies. With a thorough understanding of these processes, 
one can begin to see how business actors influence the making of foreign policy. 
 
Russian state agencies
Russian industry
The Russian public
Russia US 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1  Putnam’s two-level game in this study 
 
Figure 1.1 illustrates Putnam’s two-level game in this study. Here, the Russian 
government has to take into account the positions of various public and private 
domestic actors when it meets the United States in the bilateral relationship. 
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Figure 1.2  The focus of this study 
 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the focus of this study. The relationship between Russian state 
and business actors is central, but at the same time, both state and business actors 
maintain relations with American actors. The Russian state-business relationship is 
therefore also influenced by the bilateral Russian-US relationship. 
1.3.2  The dependent variable 
This study’s dependent variable is the network. A network is defined as an enduring 
linkage pattern, where politicians, bureaucrats and interest representatives are 
interdependent. In short, networks are institutionalised channels for transactions (van 
Waarden 1992:31). In this study, networks are characterised and operationalised 
through six dimensions.  
1. Actors: Who are the actors, and how many actors are there? 
2. Functions: What do the actors do, e.g., exchange information, or negotiate? 
3. Structure: Is the network large and open, or small and closed? 
4. Institutionalisation: Are relations between the actors stable, or formalised? 
5. Power relations: Does the state side or the business side seem to have more 
autonomy than the other? 
6. Strategies of the public administration: Is it accessible, not accessible, or does it 
actively support specific organised interests? 
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State-business interaction as networks 
Russia’s political economy is a hybrid in which market principles and other 
organising principles coexist. Hierarchies from the Soviet period have disappeared, 
and it is still debated whether new ones function well as organising principles. 
Networks therefore seem useful to systematise the organisation of state-business 
interaction, and the network dimensions are flexible, and allow for comparison across 
different cases and sectors. The network dimensions are also useful for comparing the 
four models in this study.  
The network framework is a descriptive tool in which influences on state-business 
interaction can vary according to societal level, policy area or organisation (Kjellberg 
and Reitan 1995: 89, 91). That is an advantage in this study. The framework does not 
restrict the type of influences that the network variable can be subject to. However, the 
network as a dependent variable is somewhat problematic. A network can also (and is 
likely to) influence its surroundings. In this way, the causal relationship between 
variables becomes unclear. Explanation becomes difficult, as one cannot tell whether 
changes in the network can be explained by changing surroundings, or vice versa.  
This is a study that aims to explore the factors that may influence networks. It will 
not be possible to establish unambiguous causal relationships between the dependent 
and independent variables. The problems of an unclear causal relationship between the 
variables within a network framework are managed in two ways. Firstly, when 
describing the empirical networks, I take great care to establish at which points in time 
the networks change. When a network change follows a change outside the network, 
the external change may have influenced the network. Secondly, I try to discuss 
whether the evidence points towards other influences than that of the independent 
variables. These two precautionary procedures allow me to benefit from the 
advantages of the network framework, and avoid the worst of its disadvantages. 
1.3.3  The independent variables 
This brings the discussion on to the independent variables. This study has two 
independent variables. One is the bilateral relationship between Russia and the United 
States. The other is sector structure. The independent variables are complementary. 
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That is, they are not to be understood as rival explanations of change and variation, or 
hypotheses to be tested. The independent variables are assumptions about where the 
influences on the networks come from. They are both particularly relevant aspects of 
the networks’ context (cf. Andersen 1997: 122). 
The bilateral relationship between Russia and the United States 
The bilateral relationship between Russia and the United States is included as an 
independent variable because both of the cases in this study are trade problems 
between Russia and the United States. Therefore, I want to explore whether domestic 
Russian networks are influenced by the bilateral relationship between the two 
countries. This variable fills a gap in the existing literature.  
The bilateral relationship is here defined as official contacts between Russian and 
American government agencies. It includes negotiations, letters, telephone 
conversations, visits, bilateral agreements, and Russian and US government acts and 
statements. Perhaps needless to say, only official contacts that concern the trade issues 
under study are included.  
Sector structure 
Sector structure is a combination of the economic structure of the industry, and the 
economic weight of the industry in the Russian economy. Economic structure of the 
industry is defined as the number (many or few), size (large or small) and distribution 
(geographically dispersed or concentrated) of enterprises. Economic weight of the 
industry is the importance of the industry to the Russian economy as a whole. The two 
factors are connected with each other. An industry that has many, large and 
geographically concentrated enterprises is likely to be important to the Russian 
economy, but an industry that has few, small and geographically dispersed enterprises 
is less likely to be important.  
Determining whether a sector displays a concentrated or dispersed overall structure, 
with a significant or negligible weight, is relatively easy. In the Russian economy, 
some industries have a significant economic weight. In effect, most other industries are 
relatively unimportant on their own. Raw materials extraction and heavy and chemical 
industries are geographically concentrated in clusters. They are also composed of a 
 6 
 
few very large enterprises. In many cases, there are whole regions with many one-shop 
towns. Most other industries are in comparison dispersed and consist of smaller 
enterprises. Since the two cases are characterised by very different sector structures, I 
want to explore whether their relations to the state-business relationships are different. 
1.3.4  Four models 
Within the network framework, I use four models of state-business relations to 
analyse the networks in the cases. The models are clans; loose networking patterns; 
state capture, and elite exchange. The models are discussed and compared along the 
six network dimensions mentioned above. In the case analyses, I first use the network 
dimensions to map the empirical networks. Afterwards, I discuss how the models fit 
the empirical networks.  
1.3.5  Two cases 
Both the steel case and the poultry case consist of events. The two central events of 
the steel case are a set of bilateral steel agreements from 1999 between Russia and the 
United States, and American safeguard measures imposed on steel from Russia and 
other countries in March 2002. The central event in the poultry case is an import ban 
on American poultry imposed by Russian authorities in March 2002.  
1.3.6  Reasons for choosing the cases 
The cases were chosen for their political significance as well as out of practical 
considerations.  
Political significance 
In US-Russian trade, steel and poultry are among the more important products 
economically. Trade with steel and poultry acquired unprecedented prominence in the 
bilateral relationship between Russia and the United States in March 2002. The 
Russian media linked the Russian poultry import ban to the American safeguard 
measures against Russian steel, and called it a trade war. The media suspected that the 
Russian import ban on American poultry was retaliation against the American 
protective import duties on steel. The political significance of the cases makes it 
interesting in its own right to study the networks between state and business actors, 
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because of widespread allegations that business actors influenced state actors to 
impose an import ban on poultry. This issue is discussed on page 47. 
Practical considerations 
The cases are well covered in Russian and international media because of their 
political significance. This eased the initial search for actors and evidence. The 
industries are easily delineated from neighbouring industries, and a limited number of 
actors participate. This made it possible to carry out the study within the time frame 
available. In spite of the political significance of the cases, they lack the sensitivity of 
for example military matters. Therefore actors are relatively approachable. 
Background information and data are also relatively openly available.  
1.4  Delimitations of the study 
1.4.1  Empirical delimitations of the study 
The cases in this study are limited in time. For the steel case, the limits are autumn 
1998 and the end of 2002. The limits for the poultry case are the middle of 2001 and 
the end of 2002. During these periods, the cases’ central events took place. For both 
cases, the study includes a few references to developments before 1998 and in 2003, 
but they are not part of the analyses. The time frame allows for studying state-business 
interaction in some detail. At the same time, the cases end in late 2002 because the 
trade issues in question underwent substantial changes in early 2003. The cases 
therefore reached a preliminary end in 2002. 
1.4.2  Theoretical delimitations of the study 
This study does not aim to contribute to the studies of Soviet networks, nor on 
change in networks from the Soviet period to the post-Soviet period. However, I will 
refer to this debate on pages 28 and 29, when I discuss the development of research on 
networks in post-Soviet Russia.  
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1.5  Methodological comments 
1.5.1  The choice of a multiple, embedded case study 
The case study was chosen as a research design for this study for two reasons. 
Firstly, the case study is a desirable research strategy, because it is well suited to 
analyse the full variety of detail within a contemporary context. Secondly, in a 
qualitative case study, the empirical cases may in light of theory be simplified to a few 
theoretical variables. This makes it possible to generalise from a complicated set of 
empirical details to the theoretical variables. In short, a case study is suitable for 
dealing with “operational links [that need] to be traced over time” (Yin 1994: 5).  
In each case, some events and sub-processes have been chosen as subunits. 
Consequently, this study is designed as a multiple, embedded case study. To find the 
subunits, I looked for the events where the state-business relationship is especially 
important, or where the actors manage crucial issues. I also asked actors and observers 
during interviews which events they considered most important for their sector in the 
period under study. This approach delimits the cases and makes it feasible to study 
them within the space given here.  
1.5.2  Different analytical elements in the research design 
This study contains elements of description, theory interpretation, and exploration. 
The network approach is used to organise the description and analysis of the empirical 
networks. I also use four models to analyse the empirical networks. The element of 
exploration in the study concerns the connection between the independent and 
dependent variables. To study this connection, I analyse events chronologically (cf. 
Yin 1994: 116-117). One of the findings in this analysis is that change in one of the 
independent variables is followed by change in the dependent variable. This study is 
not a causal inquiry. The pattern of coinciding variation between one of the 
independent variables and the dependent variable cannot be substantiated as a causal 
link. This is because the two independent variables chosen for the study are not 
mutually exclusive, as discussed on pages 5-6.  
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If one were to consider only the last, exploratory element of the design of this study, 
one could call it an exploratory study as discussed by Yin, a study that “explore[s] 
those situations in which […] [there is] no clear, single set of outcomes” (1994: 15), 
and that may assess “the value of further investigating various hypotheses or 
propositions” (1994: 140). However, the exploratory element in this study is connected 
to a gap in the existing literature. Therefore, I find it more accurate to define this part 
of the study as motivated by theory. This is discussed by Svein Andersen as one of 
four case study designs (1997: 30-31).  
1.5.3  Data collection 
The data for this study was collected from November 2002 to September 2003. The 
first data search was conducted mainly on the Internet. Systematic searches were 
carried out in news and news clippings archives,1 media outlets’ archives,2 and through 
search engines. I also searched for data on the web pages of Russian and American 
ministries and agencies. During a research trip in May-June 2003, I conducted 
informal interviews in Moscow. Some respondents gave me access to written sources. 
Two respondents replied in written form to my questions due to a lack of time. I also 
searched for data in various libraries in Helsinki. This was particularly useful for 
completing the search for newspaper clippings.3  
1.5.4  Data’s completeness and bias  
In spite of an extensive search for written material, internal material from the 
involved state agencies and businesses was unavailable. This is a common problem 
when writing about recent events. Therefore I decided to conduct interviews. There is 
however still a scarcity of first hand sources. When establishing a course of events 
from second hand sources, I therefore used many different data sources. I compared 
                                                 
1 Most important were the archives of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty [http://www.rferl.org], Johnson’s Russia 
List [http://www.cdi.org/russia/Johnson/], and the US Poultry and Egg Export Council‘s Moscow office 
[http://www.usapeec.ru]. 
2 Most important were the archives of the Russian newspapers and magazines Vedomosti, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 
Vremia MN, Krestianskie Vedomosti, Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt, and the internet-based outlet Gazeta.ru. Other 
archives included those of the newpapers and magazines Izvestiia, Novaia gazeta, and Rossiiskaia gazeta, 
Moskovskaia Promyshlennaia gazeta, Ekspert, Versiia/Sovershenno sekretno, Vremia novostei, and the news 
agency Ria-Novosti.  
3 Most importantly, from the newspaper Kommersant and the weekly news magazine Kommersant-Vlast.  
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interviews and written reports throughout the analysis in order to improve the 
construct validity of the data. 
Completeness in interviews 
When preparing for interviews, I compiled a list of actors for each case from media 
reports. Media reports do not always include all actors, and this reduces the data’s 
completeness. I then made a selection from the list of actors. This was a subjective 
judgment, based on which organisations and individuals appeared to be most central 
and active in the cases. In the end I interviewed the individuals with whom I could 
establish contact and was granted an appointment.  
The selection and self-selection of respondents is a problem when it comes to the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the organisation Rosptitsesoiuz for the poultry case, and 
for the steel producers and the Industry Ministry for the steel case. I was not able to 
obtain interviews with any representative from these agencies and firms. The Industry 
Ministry and the steel producers were very thoroughly covered in other sources, while 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rosptitsesoiuz were not that well covered. Still, they 
are present in the written material to such an extent that I could make well-founded 
conclusions. 
To receive as much information as I wanted from the respondents, I tried to give 
them ample information about the questions I wanted to ask, and what kind of 
information I would need. Practical obstacles occasionally hindered such efforts. I also 
took great care to describe the study and my research questions at the beginning of 
each interview. In general, the respondents were open to an unexpected extent, and 
answered my questions thoroughly.  
Bias within sources 
Most of the sources were biased in some way. For example, some respondents and 
journalists may prefer to be indirect or carefully balanced in their criticism of the 
government. This is a problem when it leads to omission of crucial details about the 
course of events in the cases. As far as possible, I have tried to compensate for bias by 
using multiple sources, and assessing how I might still use the sources, while being 
aware of their bias. 
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Bias in the selection of sources 
The reliance on media sources has its drawbacks. Without using media reports as 
sources, data for this study would hardly have been available. On the other hand, 
media reports already represent a selection of sources and events. Therefore I carried 
out an extensive search for media sources, to avoid relying too much on one outlet. In 
addition, I asked all respondents about which events they assessed as more important 
in the cases. Their answers were rather similar. 
Another drawback is the reliance on the US Poultry and Egg Export Council’s 
(USAPEEC) news clippings archive on the Internet. This archive gave me access to 
media reports for the poultry case, including many reports that I eventually used as 
sources. Parts of the material, e.g., all reports from the news agency Interfaks and most 
from Kommersant, would otherwise have been unavailable to me. For available media 
sources reproduced in the archive, I checked the original to establish whether 
USAPEEC staff had edited them. I also carried out extensive searches in quoted media 
outlets to find out whether all relevant articles had been included in the USAPEEC 
archive. 
1.5.5  Reliability and consistency in the study 
Throughout the data collection and analysis, reliability was ensured through 
documentation of procedures and thorough notes. All communication with prospective 
respondents was documented in an electronic spreadsheet. Sources were systematised 
according to type and date. All written sources and interview notes are preserved and 
systematised in an archive. 
Interviews pose a specific reliability challenge, because notes must be accurate and 
complete. I did not record interviews, but relied on notes that I completed and wrote 
out soon afterwards. During interviews, I often repeated statements and rephrased 
especially important answers in my own words, to make sure I had understood them.  
1.6  Outline of the study 
This study consists of five chapters. After this introduction comes a theoretical 
chapter, where the network approach, and the four models are further elaborated and 
discussed. Then come two chapters with description, findings and analysis of the cases 
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in this study. Further discussion of the findings, and implications for further research 
are presented in the conclusion. Background material in the form of tables and figures 
can be found in the Appendix.  
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2  A theoretical framework for state-business interaction 
This study’s theoretical framework draws on models of relations between state and 
society. As described in the first chapter, the theoretical aim of this study is firstly to 
discuss whether some models are better suited than others to describe state-business 
interaction in the two cases. The second aim is to explore factors that may explain how 
networks are formed and change, and to find out whether relations with other countries 
influence domestic networks.  
The network framework systematises state-business interaction according to a 
number of dimensions. This chapter starts with a presentation of the six dimensions 
used in this study: actors, functions, structures, institutionalisation, power relations and 
strategies of the public administration. After this, I discuss the network concept in 
more detail. I then elaborate why I chose four models of state-business interaction for 
this study and discuss their general shortcomings. This is followed by a presentation of 
the models, and a comparison of them according to the network dimensions. 
Afterwards, I place the models in the research debate on state-business interaction in 
contemporary Russia. The last section of this chapter describes the operational 
approach in this study.  
2.1  The network framework 
2.1.1  The network defined 
Networks are defined as more enduring linkage patterns based on an 
interdependence of politicians, bureaucrats and interest representatives, that is, as 
institutionalised channels for transactions (van Waarden 1992: 31). The network 
framework provides “a continuum along which elite interaction may be organised in 
various ways” (Steen 2003: 146). Shortly summarised, in networks, contacts and ties 
channel access to decision-making and/or policy making processes. The networks also 
often channel cooperation in policy formation, implementation and legitimation (van 
Waarden 1992: 31; cf. Milward and Francisco 1983).  
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2.1.2  Network dimensions 
Frans van Waarden distinguishes between seven major dimensions of networks 
(1992: 32-37), and I have chosen six of them for this study.4 Firstly, actors. Who are 
the actors? One important subdimension is the number of actors, which determines the 
size of the network. The type of actors is also important: Do they come from state 
agencies, businesses, or interest organisations? Is there a representational monopoly?  
Secondly, functions. Van Waarden sees networks as channels of communication, 
but the relationship between state and business may include other functions as well, for 
example: “channeling access to decisionmaking processes; consultation, or exchange 
of information; negotiation (…); coordination of otherwise independent action; and 
cooperation in policy formulation, implementation and legitimation” (van Waarden 
1992: 33-34). Listed in this order, the functions imply an increasing intensity in the 
relationship.  
Thirdly, there is structure, meaning the pattern of relations between actors. The 
pattern depends on how large the network is. It also depends on whether the network 
has open and fluent, or closed and monopolistic, boundaries. Further, networks vary 
according to the frequency and duration of interaction, that is, intensity. Multiple 
relations can link actors: the more different actors in the network have different 
linkages, the higher the network’s density. The network can be coordinated by 
hierarchical authority, or by horizontal consultation and bargaining. And a network is 
more or less stable, which is also a subdimension of its structure.  
Van Waarden sees one structural property as especially important: 
institutionalisation, and treats it as a dimension in its own right. To what extent are 
contacts formalised, and are they stable? The fifth dimension discussed in this study is 
power relations. This refers to the relative autonomy of state agencies towards 
business actors and of business actors towards the state. For example, state agencies 
may be captured or colonised by business interests or, on the contrary, state actors may 
capture societal organisations or use them for instrumental purposes.  
                                                 
4 The one that is left out is conventions of interaction. This refers to the “rules of the game”, which govern the 
exchanges within the network (van Waarden 1992:36). The dimension was left out because it is difficult to 
measure. 
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The last dimension in this study is strategies of public administration. Van 
Waarden argues that actor strategies can be studied usefully from the perspective of 
administrative agencies, and this is the approach here as well. This dimension refers to 
the extent to which state actors select or change participating actors, and whether they 
attempt to shape the relations with these actors. 
2.2  The use of the network framework here 
The network concept was developed to systematise the discussion of state-societal 
relations within policy areas (Kjellberg and Reitan 1995: 86). The concept is well 
suited for both the empirical and the theoretical purposes of this study because it is 
flexible. The network dimensions that systematise state-societal relations are designed 
for comparison of cases from different societal sectors. The dimensions are also useful 
tools for describing interest mediation within different sectors and industries. 
Moreover, these dimensions make it possible to compare and discuss different models 
of state-societal relations. Another aspect of the network framework’s analytical 
flexibility is that it different factors may influence a network’s characteristics 
(Kjellberg and Reitan 1995: 91). This is especially important here, because I aim to 
explore precisely such factors. The network perspective is a descriptive tool (Kjellberg 
and Reitan 1995: 89), and therefore particularly well suited for exploration.  
It is important that the network concept is not understood as a catchall term for 
contacts and the exchange of resources between state actors and societal actors in 
general (see e.g. Rhodes 1990; Smith 1994: 34). The network literature is diverse, and 
throughout the development of the concept the word network has taken on many 
meanings.5 Here, the network framework allows for a systematic comparison of 
theoretical models, and is a useful tool for systematising empirical data.  
                                                 
5 For the development of the concept, see Milward and Francisco (1983: 282-285), van Waarden (1992), Smith 
(1994), and Hill (1997: 66-74). 
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2.3  The choice of models for the study 
2.3.1  The models’ origins 
The models presented here have been developed in studies of state-business 
interaction in Russia.  
The models’ theoretical and scholarly origins are attractive. The clan approach, 
described below, draws on a large body of scholarship, mostly originating in 
clientelism. As defined by Luis Roniger, clientelist arrangements are “built around 
asymmetric but mutually beneficial and open-ended transactions and predicated on the 
differential control by social actors over the access and flow of resources in stratified 
societies” (1994: 3). This definition is open to different interpretations: it could even 
be a point of departure for all the models discussed below. And in turn, the clan 
approach has partly influenced the development of the other models in this study. The 
models are not discussed as variations on clientelism here. Still, they do represent 
different approaches in a research debate (briefly summarised later in this chapter) that 
developed out of clientelism.  
2.3.2  Shortcomings in the models 
Reliance on description 
The clan and state capture models of state-business relations both developed partly 
as answers to the question of why a market economy did not emerge in Russia. 
Therefore, they have their limits, discussed in more detail below. One could even 
question whether they can be called models of state-business relations. They are still 
sketchy, and many aspects and implications of them have not yet been analysed. In the 
case of elite exchange and loose networking patterns, this development has come even 
shorter. In essence, the models share a lack of abstraction. To use them, one has to rely 
on description. However, the purpose here is precisely that of description, and 
analysing the data. When using the models for analysis within a broader network 
framework, they can be fruitful.  
International relations 
As discussed in chapter one, trade issues involve both foreign and domestic policies 
and politics. Therefore, when considering the factors that may influence the state-
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business networks in the cases, it seems important not to overlook the bilateral 
relations between Russia and the United States.  
The models discussed below do not take international relations into account. This 
may be a shortcoming. These models are primarily developed for studying state-
business relations within sectors, rather than across sectors. How to adjust them to the 
study of the domestic-international intersection is a complex question. Is it possible, 
for example, that domestic loose networking patterns can include bilateral relations? 
Can clans have a bilateral membership? In this analysis, I explore how bilateral 
relations influence the networks under study. 
2.4  The models 
2.4.1  Clans 
The clan model focuses on relations between one major societal interest group, with 
a representational monopoly, and the state. The structure is closed, and links are 
provided through horizontal consultation and mobility of personnel. Decisions reflect 
the interests of the major interest group. A common assumption is that this occurs at 
the geographical centre of politics, but it can be applied to regional politics as well. 
Whether taking place in the federal centre or in regional ones, clan relations are high-
level contacts between state and business. There is less emphasis on intra-business 
relations, and this is a shortcoming in the model. As clan relations are channels for 
transmitting influence between a major interest group and the state, they can affect all 
types of policies. The selection of partners in the clan follows a principle of 
exclusivity, that is, the public administration is accessible, but only to the selected 
interest group. The clan is stable over time, and enforcement mechanisms operate “on 
a normative basis, with shared values and interpersonal trust compensating for 
institutional deficits” (Lehmbruch 2001: 195-196, emphasis added). 
Use of the clan model in Russia 
In studies of post-Soviet political economies, the clan is a common model of 
interest mediation (Kharkhordin 1994; Vorozheikina 1994; Stark and Bruszt 1998; 
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Lane 2000; Hosking 2000; Wedel 2001; Rutland 2001).6 Some authors see exclusive, 
informal contacts as the main explanation of Russian policymaking, or as an 
explanation of the market’s failure. For example, David Lane, seeing Russia as a 
“chaotic social formation”, argues that its social and economic system “lacks 
institutional coordination and promotes social fragmentation” (2000: 497). In 
consequence, personal networks “on an industry, regional and bureaucratic basis 
determine outcomes” (Lane 2000: 499). Shevtsova argues similarly when she says that 
“[i]n the absence of independent institutions, the vacuum was filled by groups of 
influence, and the struggle among them for political clout and property was the major 
substance of politics in Russia.” Unlike some other observers, she sees the “clan 
struggle” as something that takes place in all societies. However, “[t]he problem in 
Russia was that neither the rule of law nor independent institutions constrained the 
clan wars” (2003: 194). Consequently, coordination of the “interests of clans and 
moguls” becomes one of the cabinet’s more important tasks (2003: 222).  
It is not an uncommon assumption that there are several competing clans in Russian 
politics (Johnson 1997: 333; Graham 1999: 329). Janine R. Wedel has called this the 
clan-state, “a state captured by unauthorized groups and characterized by private 
property and pervasive corruption” (2001: 11). In the clan-state, furthermore, 
“individual clans, each of which controls property and resources, are so closely 
identified with particular ministries or institutional segments of government that the 
respective agendas of the state and the clan become indistinguishable” (2001: 11). This 
can be seen as a variation of state capture, where different clans’ interests dominate 
state policies. The clan model will in this study not be seen to necessarily include 
outright capture of state agencies.  
Criticism of the clan model applied to Russia 
Lehmbruch argues that proponents of the clan approach fall victim to a false 
functionalistic logic (2001: 200). She agrees that Russia “lacks institutionalized 
sources of trust”. However, she criticises the idea that clans, in the absence of a state 
that guarantees contract enforcement in the market, can guarantee contracts through 
informal contacts. This she calls a “logical jump”, an erroneous inference. The 
                                                 
6 The clan model is sometimes referred to as directors’ networks. 
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erroneous inference is that “the level of contract enforcement is constant across 
societies and across time” (2001: 200). Instead, she argues that the level of contract 
enforcement varies across societies and time. Moreover, she criticises an assumption 
common in the clan approach, that trust is based on traditional social formations, like 
kinship ties. This is hardly conceivable, she holds, in an industrial society like Russia. 
The clan approach has guided studies of state-business relations in many countries. 
But one can still criticise it for being too specifically tied to studies of East Asia, 
especially China and South Korea. When applying concepts closely associated with 
the South Korean chaebols to Russian clans, substantial empirical differences between 
the two are disregarded. This can be seen as a consequence of holding one set of 
conditions, the market, up as an ideal, and allocating the opposing set of attributes to 
informal relations (Lehmbruch 2001: 198).  
2.4.2  Loose networking patterns 
A less integrated pattern 
A recent study of state-business channels of influence found that business 
associations are important for successful lobbyists in Russia (Frye 2002). One could 
assume that business associations are less useful to successful lobbyists, because they 
lobby directly, or form part of clans. Frye (2002: 1018) argues that organisational ties 
are one of a multitude of channels for firms to influence state policies. From this point 
of view, formalised channels and procedures supplement informal channels of 
influence. The formalised channels may have diverse functions, and business 
associations provide state actors with a potential channel for policy implementation.  
Characteristics of the loose networking pattern 
Lehmbruch provides an approach to this way of interpreting state-business relations 
in Russia (2001). She proposes that “loose networking patterns” characterise ties 
between enterprises and state actors, and between businesses. Ties are informal, but 
need not be close, cohesive, or clan-like. Instead, ties are formed according to the 
purpose, i.e., they are utilitarian. They are also disjointed and unconnected, and they 
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exist on a case-by-case or ad hoc basis (2001: 210). Contacts and their channels 
change over time, but the general system carries traits of a stable instability.7  
Arguments for the loose networking pattern 
The loose networking patterns are a consequence of what Lehmbruch refers to as 
the pervasive uncertainty of the post-Soviet economy. Uncertainty shortens time 
horizons, but it also fosters opportunism. Therefore, the risks of operating in an 
uncertain political and economic environment prompt actors to reduce, or at least, 
manage uncertainties through hedging strategies.  
For enterprises, one hedging strategy is to work with multiple business partners. 
Another strategy is to rely on transactions with foreign partners (Lehmbruch 2001: 
214). But not all risks can be met with these strategies. Lehmbruch argues that 
business actors have followed two complementary strategies as they have tried to 
manage the uncertain environment (1999: 7-8; 2001: 20). They have tried to spread 
risks by multiplying, rather than strengthening, ties with state actors and other 
businesses. They have also tried to avoid risks by minimising exposure, that is, they 
have pursued vertical integration and autarchy as business strategies. 
The loose networking pattern in interest mediation in Russia 
One consequence of the multiplication of ties is an increasing demand for political 
brokerage. The most important function of business associations is not to aggregate 
and represent collective interests, but to intermediate individual interests (Lehmbruch 
2001: 168). Business associations broker connections for their members and clients, 
while only “halfheartedly catering to the collective needs” of their members 
(Lehmbruch 2001: 169). As such, this represents a modification of the clientelistic 
logic: brokers act as intermediaries between patrons and clients, or as “highly expert 
network specialists” (Boissevain 1974: 147-148; Clapham 1982: 8). Direct ties 
between state and business actors supplement brokerage, as this is one way of 
multiplying ties. 
The demand for brokerage, and the multiplicity of loose networking ties, form a 
system of stable instability. Institutions are weak, but these features of the system 
                                                 
7 She also suggests that this characterised the Soviet economy, when constant shortages led to ‘fire-fighting’ 
instead of stability (Lehmbruch 2001: 210). 
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provide structural stability. This applies to both state and market institutions. 
Therefore the instability: organisations come and go, as do particular ties and contacts. 
But the demand for their functions, the demand for interest mediation, remains.  
Shortcomings of the loose networking pattern 
The loose networking approach is based on studies of intra-business and business-
state ties. One can use it at all levels of state-business interaction, and regarding all 
types of policies. The state side of state-business contacts is less clearly illuminated in 
this approach. However, the environment of pervasive uncertainty, which here has a 
profound influence on networks, affects state actors as well as business actors.  
2.4.3  State capture 
State capture is a model of state-society relations of relatively recent origins.8 
Especially from 1999, it has been proposed as relevant for post-communist transition 
economies, and Russia is prominent among the countries for which it is proposed.  
The state capture approach focuses on the extent to which firms bribe state 
agencies, and/or exercise influence over state agencies that benefits them more than it 
costs, to affect reforms and policies. One reason for including a discussion of the term 
in this chapter is that the concept of elite exchange developed as a response to some of 
the state capture literature. In addition, some variations of the clan model can, as 
mentioned above, come close to a popular view of state capture. For the sake of clarity 
in the analysis, state capture is therefore discussed in some detail. 
Characteristics of state capture 
In state capture, contacts between state and business actors include a limited 
number of non-state actors who have captured the state. There are several 
definitions of state capture, and a lack of consensus surrounds the term (Frye 2002: 
1017). Joel S. Hellman and Mark Schankermann define state capture as activities 
undertaken by private agents to “shape government policy (including regulatory agents 
and the judiciary) through illicit and non-transparent methods” (2000: 546).9 When 
private agents shape government policy without using illicit private payments to public 
                                                 
8 It is occasionally referred to as the capture economy. 
9 This is distinct from administrative corruption, which distorts the “prescribed implementation of official rules 
and policies” (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000: 3, emphasis in original). 
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officials, it is defined as influence (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000: 3). In other 
words, the means applied distinguish state capture from influence on state policies.  
Frye, who prefers another approach to state capture, defines it as occurring “where 
firms exercise influence over state policy while bearing little cost for their efforts” 
(2002: 1021, emphasis added). This is what in Hellman and Schankermann’s 
definition would be mere influence, and not state capture. The definition partly 
determines whether state capture is a useful approach. Frye’s definition is broader, and 
brings the less obvious sources of influence into the picture. This makes it easier to 
compare actors with financial leverage over public officials with those that have other 
sources of leverage. In this view, the means of influence matter less than costs and 
benefits of actors’ influence.  
Regardless of definition, economic policies and their implementation will first and 
foremost be affected in state capture. However, they need not be the only targets. 
Other policies might also be of interest to captor firms. State capture is, like clan 
relations, most often seen to affect state-business relations at the highest political level, 
both in the geographical centre and on the periphery. 
State capture in this study 
Frye’s definition is also my approach to state capture. I find it useful to see state 
capture as a situation in which business interests influence state policies without 
having to give anything in return to the authorities. The reason for this is that state 
capture defined this way compares more easily to the other models. It is problematic to 
include illicit payments in the network framework, as one would have to do in the 
other definition. 
State capture in Russia 
Russia is among the countries with a high score on indexes of state capture (e.g., 
Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000). State capture is mostly studied from the firms’ 
perspective. This means that while there have been several studies to measure the 
share of firms that engage in capture, there have been few studies that measure the 
share of state agencies affected by it. Capture is a strategy of new firms, which are 
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faced with competition from “influential incumbent firms with close historical and 
formal ties to the state” (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann 2000: 35).  
Shortcomings in a state capture model 
The firms’ perspective implicit in the state capture model gives few opportunities to 
study intra-business relations. Also, business actors outside firms, e.g., business 
associations, seem to be excluded from the state capture network. One could imagine 
that business associations act as intermediaries for influence in state capture. However, 
the approach is focused on capture as something firms engage in towards state 
agencies directly, without intermediaries. 
2.4.4  Elite exchange 
Frye shows that politically influential firms use a wide variety of means to influence 
state policies (2002). Still, his results indicate that capture of the state is less relevant 
as a characterisation of the firm-state relationship than elite exchange.  
Characteristics of elite exchange 
Elite exchange occurs where “successful lobbyists gain influence by providing 
benefits to state officials” (Frye 2002: 1021, emphasis added). In his study, Frye finds 
that two kinds of benefits are provided to state officials, namely, inspections (including 
tax inspections), and price controls. Inspections by state agencies offer multiple 
opportunities for corruption for politicians and bureaucrats, while price controls 
“disperse benefits to the broad voting public, while inflicting costs on small groups of 
firms” (Frye 2002: 1029). This is also a view of the firm level. Rutland, however, 
argues a similar point at the societal level: “lobbying in Russia is a two-way 
process—and more top-down than bottom-up, since the state creates and sustains most 
business groups” (Rutland 2001: 24, emphasis added).  
Elite exchange in Russia 
Bunin et al. (2002) argue for the notion of an exchange within state-business 
channels of communication. They approach the issue of business organisations from 
the side of state agencies. Their argument is that in the politics of accession talks to the 
World Trade Organisation, Russian state agencies saw the need for shaping the 
organisational environment according to their needs. This suggests that state agencies 
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have an instrumental view of business associations. However, one can also see it as 
strengthening the idea of interest brokerage and elite exchange. Access to 
policymaking processes (and WTO access negotiation) for business actors was in their 
view exchanged for state actors’ influence of the organisation of brokerage. Both sides 
accordingly shape the mediation channels.10 Shevtsova suggests something similar 
when she refers to the so-called oligarchs joining the Russian Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) in 2001. Until then, the RSPP was a lobby for dogmatic 
Soviet directors. She argues that the oligarchs were pressured by the Kremlin to join 
the RSPP, thus achieving its “goal of getting all the industrialists and oligarchs in one 
place and under its control” (Shevtsova 2003: 180). 
Elite exchange in this study 
In sum, the notion of quid pro quo-relations (Frye 2002) between politicians and 
bureaucrats on one side, and business actors on the other, may prove a useful approach 
to state-business relations, between the state and firms, and between the state and 
business associations. Here, elite exchange is seen as a network in which business 
leaders are not allowed to influence policies without providing something in return. 
Also, this is a network where both state and business actors influence the channels of 
communication. This is a reciprocal relationship, where power is more equally 
distributed than in a state capture relationship.  
Shortcomings in an elite exchange model 
Elite exchange is relevant for studying state-business interaction at all levels, not 
only the highest level. It is however less useful for approaching intra-business ties. 
Using this approach, influence on different kinds of policies and their implementation 
are the targets of business activities towards state actors. But state actors as well try to 
influence business policies. 
                                                 
10 Bunin et al. also argue that major business actors, most notably Oleg Deripaska of Russian Aluminium, in this 
fashion were co-opted into supporting Russian WTO accession, in return for a substantial influence on the 
timetable and substance of accession talks (2002). 
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2.5  The models compared and systematised 
Do the four models complement each other, or are they mutually exclusive from a 
network perspective? The table below shows the expectations in each of the models 
for the dimensions described in 2.1.  
Table 2.1  The models systematised according to network dimensions 
 Network model 
Network dimension Clans Loose 
networking 
patterns 
State capture Elite exchange 
Actors: state 
agencies and… 
…one major 
interest group with 
an informal 
representational 
monopoly 
…many 
businesses and 
interest brokers, 
mainly business 
associations 
…a limited 
number of firms  
…an unspecified 
number of 
businesses, and 
business 
associations 
Functions  
-channelling access Yes Yes Yes Yes 
-consultation Yes Yes Yes Yes 
-negotiation Yes Possible Yes Possible 
-cooperation Yes Less likely Yes Possible 
Structure Closed boundaries; 
membership 
exclusive  
Open boundaries; 
membership on 
case-by-case basis. 
Demand for 
brokerage 
Fluent boundaries; 
but total number 
of members 
restricted  
Open boundaries; 
membership is 
stable. Brokerage 
is possible 
-type of 
coordination 
Horizontal 
consultation, 
mobility of 
personnel 
Hierarchical 
authority 
Hierarchical 
authority 
Hierarchical 
authority 
-density High Low Medium Medium 
-intensity High Low Medium Medium 
-stability High Low Low Medium 
Institutionalisation High, and informal Low, mainly 
informal  
Low, and informal Medium, and 
informal 
Power relations Open to capture of 
state by society: 
low state 
autonomy 
State agencies are 
autonomous, 
society has some 
influence 
Societal interests 
have captured 
state agencies 
Power is equally 
distributed 
between state and 
societal actors 
Strategies of 
public 
administration 
Exclusive access 
for one group 
Access and 
recognition, but 
not active support 
for interest 
associations 
Access and 
informal 
recognition 
Access and 
informal 
recognition, and 
active support of 
preferred actors 
The network dimensions are adapted from van Waarden (1992: 39-41). 
 
 
An important issue here is of course how the state-business relationship is in each of 
the models. On the actor dimension, the models initially seem different. However, 
while clans and loose networking patterns are so different that they seem mutually 
 26 
 
exclusive, loose networking patterns and elite exchange could be combined. Likewise 
with clans and state capture: the one major interest group could well consist of a 
limited number of firms. As regards functions, clans and state capture networks 
include functions that are of a more intense kind than loose networking patterns and 
elite exchange. When it comes to structure, loose networking patterns and elite 
exchange are open, state capture is more restricted, and clans are rather closed. The 
horizontal type of coordination in clans stands out among the others, which are 
characterised by hierarchical coordination. The density, intensity and stability of the 
network are higher for clans than for the other models, and very low for loose 
networking patterns. And to take the power relations dimension, state capture and elite 
exchange are mutually exclusive. In state capture, the business side has more power. In 
elite exchange, power is more equally distributed. The strategies of the public 
administration differ less: in elite exchange, the state rather actively seeks to choose 
the members of the network, while in state capture and loose networking patterns, it 
does not. In clans, state agencies only recognise and support one interest group. 
When one takes into consideration the dimensions discussed here, there are some 
similarities between loose networking patterns and elite exchange, and some between 
clans and state capture. Expressed graphically, one could see them as placed along a 
continuum of different networks, like this: 
 
 
Clans State capture Elite exchange 
Loose 
networking 
patterns 
Figure 2.1  The models placed on a continuum 
 
At the left end of the line, networks are restricted, stable, intense, and dense, with 
high institutionalisation, many functions, and the possibility of restricted autonomy for 
the state. At the other end, networks are open, fluent, and instable, with low intensity, 
low institutionalisation, fewer functions, and more state autonomy. Clans and loose 
networking patterns are mutually exclusive models. However, in some respects, each 
of them can be complemented by one of the other approaches. State capture can 
complement clans, while elite exchange can complement loose networking patterns. 
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Partly, they approach state-business contacts from different angles, and partly, they 
address different issues of these contacts. Such a combination may provide a more 
complete understanding of evidence in the cases than a single approach.  
2.6  The development of the research debate 
In the debate about state-business networks in Russia, there are three important 
contested issues. Firstly, there is the question of how one best may describe state-
business interaction in Russia today. This debate is quite thoroughly discussed in 
section 2.4 on the four models in this study. As will be remembered, there are two 
connected questions that divide opinions more than others: (1) the degree to which 
political and economic elites are separate, or conflated, and the degree of integration 
between them, and (2) the extent to which the state is autonomous when faced with 
business interests. Secondly, these two questions are connected with the question of 
network continuity between the Soviet Union and Russia. The discussion about 
network continuity is again closely connected with the third issue, which is the 
question of how important networks were in the Soviet Union itself. To place this 
study firmly in the context of the research debate, a short excursion into the issue of 
network continuity is necessary. The question of how important networks were in the 
Soviet Union is a natural starting point.  
Scholars agree that contacts and ties served to coordinate policy implementation in 
the Soviet economy. It remains disputed whether this was a permanent system in the 
system, or perhaps an integral part of the system. In the latter view, there existed over 
time extensive clientelistic exchange between upwardly mobile officials and their 
higher-level patrons (see Hough and Fainsod 1979: 528, 542-3; Eisenstadt and Roniger 
1984: 186-191; Willerton 1992: 231; Vorozheikina 1994: 109).11 An alternative view 
is that ties were present throughout the system, but that each contact was conditional, 
arbitrary, precarious, and opportunistic (Lehmbruch 2001: 18).  
The issue of continuation between the Soviet Union and Russia is connected with 
this. Many writers who use the framework of clans and clan-like networks assume that 
                                                 
11 These links between officials in the Party and government systems are occasionally confused with everyday 
favours, most often referred to as blat, of a general and material kind. 
 28 
 
there is considerable continuation between the late Soviet and the post-Soviet period 
(e.g. Kharkhordin and Gerber 1994; Sapir 1996: 66-68). A middle view is taken by 
Tatiana Vorozheikina, who argues that the existing Soviet clientelistic networks were 
weakened in 1990-92 as many new actors came into the system, and the system itself 
disintegrated and changed. Political struggle then “enhanced the clientelistic 
dimension of the new polity” (1994: 112). New networks included both state and 
private interests, as business mixed with bureaucracy in the new, transitional economy. 
Lehmbruch argues that the collapse of the Soviet system eventually met with a 
response from actors, slowly transforming the system and turning it into what it is 
today—a hybrid (2001: 32-33, 55-56). In her view, explanations based on Russian 
traditional ties and the uniqueness of its societal mechanisms are unconvincing when 
applied to what she sees as a mix of traditional and modern elements in the Russian 
political economy (2001: 4-6, 193-209, 232-237). Some traits of the economic system, 
and even some individual ties and contacts, may be similar in the Soviet and post-
Soviet periods. But this cannot be equated with continuity, because the system is not a 
continuation of the Soviet system. She prefers to describe Russian society today as a 
“peculiar mix of modern and traditional, personal and impersonal, formal and informal 
elements” (2001: 21). 
2.7  Transforming theory into practice 
2.7.1  The independent variables 
There are two independent variables in this study: bilateral relations between Russia 
and the United States, and sector structure. The independent variables are assumptions 
about where influences on the networks come from, and they are not to be understood 
as alternatives to each other. The independent variables are presented and discussed on 
pages 5-7. As will be remembered, they are operationalised as follows. 
The independent variable bilateral relationship between Russia and the United 
States is operationalised as  
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• Official contacts between Russian and American government agencies: 
negotiation, letters, telephone conversations, visits, bilateral agreements, and 
Russian and American government acts and statements.  
The independent variable sector structure combines the economic structure of the 
industry with the economic weight of the industry in the Russian economy:  
• Economic structure of the industry is the number, size and distribution of 
enterprises;  
• Economic weight of the industry is the importance of the industry to the 
Russian economy as a whole. 
2.7.2  The dependent variable: description 
The dependent variable network is operationalised through the six dimensions 
discussed on page 15: actors, functions, structure, institutionalisation, power relations, 
and strategy of public administration. Here, the dimensions are specified and 
elaborated with series of questions that I will ask throughout the analysis. The 
questions address the task of describing the networks in the cases. It also makes it 
possible to discuss whether they can be understood using the models from this chapter. 
Actors: who participate? 
Who participates on the state and business sides? Does participation change over 
time? The actors can be (parts of) government agencies, enterprises, and business 
associations. Some actors are individuals, other actors are organisations represented by 
individuals. I will look for actors among participants at meetings, negotiations, and 
representatives of involved government agencies and enterprises. It is also important to 
find out how many actors there are, and whether some potential actors seem to be 
conspicuously absent. 
Functions: what do the actors do? 
Do the actors exchange information? Is there an element of negotiation between 
state and business actors? Do they discuss policy formation? Does it appear that state 
and business actors meet only to add legitimacy to decisions taken elsewhere? Does 
this change over time? 
 30 
 
Structure: how do the actors interact to carry out functions? 
Is the network open to new members? Do network members meet often? Is 
interaction intense, or is it more intermittent? Do actors meet in different 
circumstances, to discuss varying aspects of the problems? Does there seem to be any 
coordinating authority? Does the structure change over time? 
Institutionalisation: where and how often do actors meet? 
Network members may have regular meetings with more or less the same members 
from time to time, perhaps under the aegis of a formal organisation or forum. Meetings 
can also be irregular and informal, with a varied attendance. Or some arenas can be 
formalised and regular, while others are informal and irregular. This may also change 
over time. 
Power relations: decisions in the network, when and how 
The power relations in the network are indicated by the answer to several questions. 
One such question is: when decisions are made in the network, do they reflect the 
interests of state or business actors? Another is, when business actors want some kind 
of action from the side of authorities, does this action take place? Under whose aegis 
are decisions made? Are any actors excluded from participation in making certain 
decisions? Perhaps many issues appear to be settled in an informal channel with few 
participants, while a corresponding formal channel, with more members, meet to 
legitimate decisions? Does this change over time? 
Strategies of public administration: accessible and active or not 
The public administration may choose to be accessible or inaccessible to business 
actors. It is also important whether state agencies actively support business 
associations, try to create or change them, or destroy them. In their contact with 
business actors, state agencies may pursue a policy of delegating public authority. This 
may also change over time. 
2.7.3  The dependent variable: change and influence 
When determining whether and how networks change, I will describe how the 
network dimensions change over time. In short, the networks will be described 
according to whether they grow or shrink; take on more or fewer functions, or become 
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more or less intense; whether there are changes to their formalisation; or to their 
openness; and whether one perceives an increase or decrease in state autonomy. 
Having established changes in the networks, the next step will be to explore the 
factors that influence networks. Can one link changes in the networks to changes 
outside the network? And lastly, do the changes in the networks follow changes in the 
bilateral relations between Russia and the United States? Or has the sector structure 
changed? And lastly, are there other factors that seem to be important? 
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3  The steel case: history and analysis 
3.1  Introduction 
This case includes a set of steel agreements entered into between the American and 
Russian governments in 1999, and the build-up to them; subsequent efforts to have the 
agreements renegotiated; safeguard measures, including special steel duties, imposed 
by the United States in March 2002, and the Russian-American steel talks that 
followed the American declaration of Russia as a market economy in June 2002.  
The case revolves around the mutual relations between the steel industry and the 
state. The steel industry is composed of steel producers and their business associations. 
The state is also composed of multiple actors, and specifications are given along the 
way. I have tried to go in as much detail as possible. For reasons of space, I still had to 
concentrate on the largest steel producers, and on the more central state agencies as 
found during the first round of data collection. Because the central issue in the case is 
that of steel export, some steel producers and state agencies receive less attention than 
if the central issue had more to do with the domestic Russian steel market.  
The chapter is divided into three parts. There are first a few pages that introduce the 
background to the case. The next part is a historical narrative of developments in the 
case from 1998 to late 2002, including all the major events. Finally comes the analysis, 
where I discuss the case as a case of network formation and change.  
3.2  The background 
The steel market is one of the most regulated and protected international markets. 
There are widespread subsidies in steel production. There is also an overcapacity 
internationally, contributed to by inefficient excess capacity in many countries. The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) regularly hosts 
talks to reduce excess capacity and eliminate subsidies. In 2002, tariffs on steel import 
were introduced or broadened in a number of countries, following the decision by US 
President George W. Bush to introduce such tariffs on steel from many countries. 
Prices fluctuated wildly, leading to uncertainty in the international market. 
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3.2.1  Steel products and steel markets 
Steel, however, is not one product, but several. Crude steel and recycled steel are 
turned into a wide variety of steel products. In this study, I refer to four major groups 
of steel products: slabs; hot-rolled steel; cold-rolled steel, and special steels. Slabs are 
an important form of semi-finished steel. Slabs can be processed further in two ways, 
hot-rolled and cold-rolled. Among hot-rolled steel products are coils, plates, rails, 
sections, channels and beams. Cold-rolled products are mainly various sheets and 
coils. Special steels are low-carbon and high-alloyed steels. Hot-rolled and cold-rolled 
steels are high value added products, while special steels frequently are niche products. 
All the steels mentioned here may be coated, e.g., galvanised or polymer-coated. This 
process, while not a part of the steel making itself, is mostly carried out at steel 
producing plants. Products like nuts, bolts and wires that result from further 
transformation of the steel are not a topic of this study. 
The many steel products have different end purposes, and their own set of market 
and price characteristics. Tariffs introduced on some products do not always affect 
trade in others. Significantly, tariffs on special steels and on high value added steels 
influence producers in some countries to reorient themselves towards production of 
less advanced, semi-finished steels.  
3.2.2  Steel in Russia 
Russian steel producers have the advantages of a relative abundance of raw 
materials, especially iron ore and coke; relatively low energy prices;12 low labour 
costs, and a well-educated and trained labour force. Technological backwardness, and 
labour-intensive production methods and plant organisation have nevertheless 
demanded significant investment expenses and reduced efficiency. Where investments 
have not been made, steel plants enjoy the temporary (and questionable) benefit of 
having inherited equipment that was already paid off during Soviet times.  
In the period under study, steel in Russia was made by a variety of producers. They 
divided more or less into three categories. There were three large and integrated 
                                                 
12 Energy prices are rising. Lobbying from the metals business in the 1990s did not lead to lower or discounted 
tariffs for energy (cf. Fortescue 1997: 94). 
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producers,13 six medium producers, and many small steel mills. The approximately 
thirty small mills each produced less than 500,000 tonnes of steel annually. Their 
capacity was below the limit of profitability, and they used outdated technologies. 
They continued to function due to soft budgetary constraints and implicit subsidies 
from local and regional governments, including disadvantageous barter deals and tax 
and/or energy arrears and non-payments. More often than not, they were the main 
employer in one-enterprise towns, and were therefore not allowed by local authorities 
to go bankrupt. While massive investments would be needed to increase productivity, 
it was uneconomic to undertake investments on this small scale (McKinsey Global 
Institute 1999: Steel).  
Each of the six medium mills produced between 500,000 and 5 million tonnes of 
steel per year.14 They were often quite specialised, but struggled to compete within 
their market segments. The medium six wielded little clout with central authorities, but 
received much support from regional authorities. The holding company EvrazHolding, 
which controlled three medium mills,15 was increasingly referred to as a major steel 
company along with the three largest producers. 
Most small and some medium mills received implicit subsidies from local 
governments. This damaged the steel industry in two ways. Firstly, medium producers 
interested in restructuring could be pressured by local governments to avoid layoffs. 
This prevented investments and restructuring in this section of the industry. Secondly, 
all medium and large steel producers were damaged by the un-level playing field in the 
market. Smaller mills were subsidised by local governments rather than closed down. 
Larger plants were profitable, but had to cover all their costs themselves and pay their 
taxes in full. As a result, domestic prices were pressured downwards. 
                                                 
13 Integrated refers to the production method. At integrated plants, there is a continuous process from raw 
materials to rolled steel. At non-integrated plants, the process is divided into steel making and re-rolling.  
14 The medium mills are Mechel in Cheliabinsk, Nizhnetagilskii Metallurgicheskii Kombinat (NTMK) in 
Sverdlovsk oblast, Zapadno-Sibirskii Metallurgicheskii Kombinat (ZapSib) and Kuznetskii Metallurgicheskii 
Kombinat (KMK) in Novokuznetsk in Kemerovo oblast, Oskolskii Elektrometallurgicheskii Kombinat (OEMK) 
by Staryi Oskol in Belgorod oblast, and NOSTA in Novotroitsk, Orenburg oblast. 
15 EvrazHolding controls NTMK, ZapSib and KMK, and together these three plants in 2002 produced 23 per 
cent of all Russian steel (Ernst & Young CIS 2003b: 4). 
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Three larger producers provided the bulk of Russia’s steel export in the period,16 
and they all produced more than 5 million tonnes a year. The larger producers operated 
in slightly different export markets. Severstal, located in Cherepovets, Vologda oblast, 
exported a diverse production range to many markets, especially the European Union. 
Severstal in 2002 produced 16 per cent of all Russian steel (Ernst & Young CIS 
2003b: 4). Magnitogorskii Metallurgicheskii Kombinat (MMK) in Cheliabinsk oblast 
was also rather diverse, and oriented towards Southeast Asia without being overly 
dependent on one market. It produced 17 per cent of all Russian steel in 2002 (Ernst & 
Young CIS 2003b: 4). Novolipetskii Metallurgicheskii Kombinat (NLMK) in Lipetsk 
oblast in 2002 produced 14 per cent of all Russian steel (Ernst & Young CIS 2003b: 
4). This was the Russian producer most dependent on the American market for export. 
Combined with a high value added production range, this left it vulnerable to 
American tariffs and quotas. However, all the three large producers were affected.  
3.2.3  Russian steel export 
Of all steel producing countries, Russia was the largest exporter in the period under 
study, except in 2002, when Japan exported more (Ernst & Young CIS 2003b: 5). In 
the early 1990s, demand in the Russian Federation decreased rapidly, and production 
contracted while export increased. In 1997, Russia exported 60 per cent of its 
production. The share fell to between 45 and 55 per cent at the time of writing. The 
industry is important to the Russian economy: In 1997, it formed 1 per cent of GDP, 
employed 0.7 per cent of the workforce and contributed 8 per cent of exports 
(McKinsey Global Institute 1999: Steel). The numbers, although not very recent,17 
illustrate the centrality of export to the Russian steel industry.  
In 2001, around 6 per cent of all Russian steel exports went to the United States 
(Novoslobodskaia 2001). From 1992 to 1998, Russian steel exports to the United 
States increased, and reached a record level in 1998 at 5.3-5.4 million tonnes, to the 
value of approximately 1.4 billion dollars (American Iron and Steel Institute 1999; 
Bardin 1999; Chernyshov 2001. The cited value seems to originate with MERT). In 
                                                 
16 Russian steel was and is exported mainly to the European Union and Southeast Asia, especially China.  
17 It has proven difficult to obtain newer, reliable numbers. The steel industry may in 2002 have represented a 
smaller share of GDP, workforce and export, because of high prices for oil, gas, and other metals. Otherwise, 
there have been few changes to the industry’s place in the Russian economy. 
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1998, steel exports provided 22 per cent of Russian hard currency earnings, while an 
estimated 70 per cent of all steel production was sold abroad (Rozhkova 1999).  
Plummeting Russian demand and a growing import dependency in the United States 
caused the growth. The Asian crisis in 1998 served to redirect international steel trade 
towards the United States.18 Another consequence of the Asian crisis was a severe 
crisis in the Russian economy. When the rouble was devaluated on 17 August 1998, it 
fell from 6 roubles to around 24 roubles per dollar in a matter of days. Prices for 
Russian steel in the United States fell accordingly. The Russian steel market collapsed. 
 Russian exporters operate mainly in the spot market, supplying medium and small 
steel consuming enterprises (Edwards 2003 [interview]). This has left them vulnerable 
to changing tariffs and trade conditions from the US government. Also, while 
American steel producers form a powerful lobby, steel consumers, not least smaller 
ones, are a more diverse and scattered group. Because of Russia’s non-membership of 
WTO, steel enterprises and the Russian government have to negotiate with the US 
government on a bilateral basis. They are deprived of international complaints 
mechanisms.  
3.3  The 1999 bilateral steel agreements 
3.3.1  Russian exporters are faced with anti-dumping accusations 
Complaints from American steel producers about foreign dumping and a looming 
steel crisis surfaced early in 1998. The price of Russian steel began to fall in August. 
In late September twelve American steel producers and two steelworkers’ unions filed 
an anti-dumping complaint against Russia and a few other countries with the American 
Department of Commerce. For Russia, the complaint concerned hot-rolled steel from 
Severstal, NLMK and MMK. Following standard procedures, anti-dumping 
investigations were opened on these producers on 15 October. If, in the course of the 
investigations, the Russian exporters were found to incur substantial losses for 
American producers, the Department of Commerce would enforce retroactive anti-
dumping tariffs. The three Russian producers retaliated quickly: In October and 
                                                 
18 Before the crisis, Southeast Asia was the region in the world with highest demand for steel. 
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November, they placed ads in several influential American newspapers, explaining 
about Russia’s economic situation. 
The Russian producers could not approach the American investigating authority, the 
International Trade Commission (ITC), directly. Russia’s non-market status with the 
United States meant that investigations and negotiations had to take place between the 
two countries’ authorities. In February 1999, the Department of Commerce ruled 
preliminarily that Russian hot-rolled steel was likely to be sold in the United States for 
less than fair value. The Russian government suggested voluntary Russian export 
reductions for many different steel products not under investigation in return for a 
suspension of the investigation. The aim was to retain a share in the American market. 
At this stage, Severstal, MMK, and NLMK were invited to submit information to the 
investigations, along with the petitioners. After several rounds of negotiations, this led 
to a suspension of the anti-dumping investigation on 13 July 1999.  
Meanwhile, American steel producers in June 1999 filed anti-dumping complaints 
against many countries, including Russia, on cold-rolled steel. The Russian Ministry of 
Trade again tried to negotiate for suspension of the investigation. In January 2000, the 
anti-dumping investigation was suspended in return for restricted market access in the 
United States for Russian producers.  
3.3.2  The 1999 US-Russian steel agreements 
The American side throughout the negotiations insisted that a steel accord should 
include different steel products. This significantly complicated matters for the 
Russians. What has later become known as the Steel Agreements consists of three 
documents: the Agreement Concerning Trade in Certain Steel Products from the 
Russian Federation (the General Agreement), initialled in February 1999 after the 
preliminary ruling, and signed in July; the Suspension of Antidumping Duty 
Investigation: Hot-Rolled Flat-Rolled Carbon-Quality Steel Products from the Russian 
Federation, also signed in July 1999, and the Suspension of Antidumping 
Investigation: Cold-Rolled Flat-Rolled Carbon-Quality Steel Products from the 
Russian Federation, agreed in January 2000 (Department of Commerce 1999a; 1999b; 
2000, respectively).  
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Under the agreements, Russian steel exporters obliged themselves to restrict the 
amount of steel exported to the United States voluntarily over the next five years. The 
amounts would increase for each year. For hot-rolled steel, there was an import 
moratorium for the rest of 1999. In addition, hot-rolled and cold-rolled steel was 
subject to minimum prices. These started above the price level on the American 
market, and could not be adjusted by more than 10 per cent for any one period under 
the agreement. While the voluntary export restrictions were harsh enough, the 
minimum price effectively excluded Russian hot-rolled and cold-rolled steel from the 
United States, a seller’s market at the time. As prices started to fall on the American 
market, the Russian producers felt the pinch acutely. According to the agreements, 
minimum prices were calculated for each quarter on the basis of the last quarter’s 
prices, further slowing the fall of the minimum price. Compliance with the agreements 
was overseen by SEMPR, the Russian Union of Metals Exporters.  
Ironically, the suspension agreement on cold-rolled steel was signed only a few 
weeks before the ITC found that the import of cold-rolled steel from Russia did not 
incur losses for American producers (Vedomosti 2000a). The Russian steel exporters 
now faced the question of how steel export would be regulated in the future, and what 
they risked if they sold cold-rolled steel below the minimum price in the suspension 
agreement. Would the suspension agreement still prevail, and the anti-dumping 
investigation be reopened? Or did the ITC’s new ruling set aside the suspension 
agreement? How did the two suspension agreements relate to the General Agreement? 
After all, the US authorities had insisted on seeing the suspension agreement on hot-
rolled steel and the General Agreement as part of the same package. The answers to 
these questions remained unclear (Vedomosti 2000b).  
3.3.3  Conflicting views of the agreements among the steel exporters 
In this period, the non-market status of the Russian economy with American 
authorities set clear conditions for relations between the three producers and Russian 
authorities on the issue. The producers could not approach US authorities directly, but 
had to go through the Russian Ministry of Trade. The producers themselves or their 
associations were not allowed to participate in delegations. This put them at a 
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disadvantage, especially as the Ministry of Trade had far fewer experts at their 
disposal than the American Department of Commerce and the ITC (Makeev 2000). It 
also seems that the Ministry of Trade was unwilling to take advice from the steel 
producers until the process had been going on for some time. 
But the three producers also disagreed among themselves. Severstal’s management 
prioritised to retain a market share, stable market access, and contacts. The company 
also further diversified its exports both in terms of steel type and geographic scope. 
Severstal supported the agreements, and would rather try to have them revised through 
negotiations than terminated through unilateral action (Prokopenko 2000a). The worst-
case scenario was a re-opening of the anti-dumping investigation, as it would threaten 
all kinds of steel exports to the United States, as opposed to many kinds (Solov’ev 
1999). Severstal had exported a broad range of products to the US before the anti-
dumping investigations started (Prokopenko 2000a),19 and the suspension agreements 
restricted export of different products to different extents.  
MMK’s management was in a comparable situation to Severstal’s, and it allegedly 
preferred the suspension agreements to complete exclusion from the American market 
(Prokopenko 2000b). Retaining an American market share was valuable to MMK as 
well. However, the company already sent the majority of its exports to Asia. As the 
Asian market recovered after the crisis, MMK’s management had an alternative for 
export expansion to the American market. 
NLMK’s management differed in its view of the agreements. The American market 
was important to the company. Crucially, NLMK exported a high proportion of hot-
rolled flat-rolled steel to the United States, and therefore, the suspension agreement 
concerning this product was especially disliked by its management (Prokopenko 
2000a). NLMK’s management claimed that it had been against the agreements 
throughout the negotiations, and criticised them after the signing. NLMK several times 
threatened with withdrawal from the agreements, and if other managements could not 
be convinced to follow, its management claimed to be prepared to do so on its own 
(Rozhkova 2000b). 
                                                 
19 According to one source, 30-33 per cent of Severstal’s total export went to the US before the anti-dumping 
investigations begun (Solov’ev 1999). 
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3.3.4  Why were the agreements signed? 
Why did the Russian side enter into the restrictive bilateral agreements? That two of 
the three producers concerned were in favour provides something of an explanation. 
Another important factor may have been the American insistence on linking all the 
affected steel products in the agreements. This raised the stakes for the Russian side, 
and made the alternative, a near exclusion from the US market for all processed steel, 
unacceptable.  
It is doubtful that the advice of Severstal carried more weight than that of NLMK. 
Both Severstal and NLMK had prominent businessmen as general directors, both of 
whom were included at President Putin’s July 2000 roundtable with major 
industrialists and businessmen.  
The general director of NLMK, Vladimir Lisin, accused the Ministry of Trade of 
passivity and disability to protect Russian economic interests (Makeev 2000). 
According to Aleksei Mordashov, general director of Severstal, it was not for a lack of 
consultation between the authorities and the enterprise managements that the 
agreements were signed. Quite the opposite—at least in the late phase of the 
negotiations, when the agreements were being finalised, the Ministry of Trade and the 
enterprise directors were in continuous contact. Still, he did not deny that the Russian 
authorities could have been more active (Prokopenko 2000b).  
Across the industry, the wish to remain in the American market was coupled with 
fear of a domino effect in other markets. Anti-dumping accusations and protectionist 
measures often spread among the major steel-importing states. Nevertheless the steel 
managers were discontented with the disadvantageous agreements. 
On the government side, the understaffed Russian Ministry of Trade had met a 
tough counterpart in the negotiations. Understaffing may have been partly to blame for 
their failure to acquire good terms for Russian steel import (Makeev 2000). Priorities 
could also have complicated their task. It seems that a priority for the Russian side was 
to maintain a good relationship with the United States on this issue. This could have 
led to the idea that it was better to give up a little in trade, to show willingness to 
compromise. But softness gave small returns. 
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3.4  After the agreements 
3.4.1  Domestic problems 
After the agreements had been signed, other problems came to the fore. The 
question of securing the small domestic market was more important than the distant 
American market (Rozhkova 2000a). This was a problem with several dimensions: the 
steel producers wanted the domestic market to grow; they faced stiff competition from 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and the import of scrap steel for recycling also took a 
considerable share of the market for new steel. In 1999, the government introduced a 
30 per cent import duty on scrap steel, which was just what the steel producers wanted. 
This import duty led to a shortage of scrap steel in Russia.  
A certain level of intra-industry controversy affected the steel business negatively in 
this period. A main source of discussion and positioning towards the authorities was 
the location of a new mill for making linepipe20 for Gazprom, the Russian gas 
corporation (Prokopenko 2000b). The potential of such a mill was not lost on any of 
the large steel producers. 
3.4.2  Renewed action towards the United States 
But the American market continued to be a sore point. Steel prices in the United 
States continued to fall, but they still remained above the level of the rest of the world. 
The minimum prices set by the suspension agreements made the Russian producers 
unable to sell their steel. In July 2000, they wanted the agreements from 1999 
renegotiated. At the least, they wanted to change the mechanism for establishing a 
minimum price, especially for hot-rolled steel. The Ministry for Economic 
Development and Trade (MERT), into which the old Ministry of Trade had been 
incorporated in May, approached the American Department of Commerce. NLMK 
contemplated withdrawal from the agreements if this did not succeed (Rozhkova 
2000b). The Department of Commerce suggested that consultations be carried forward 
to September, to give MERT more time to prepare, and also because the American 
authorities were unsure about who was their counterpart. As many posts remained 
                                                 
20 When welded together and coated, linepipe sections become pipeline.  
 42 
 
unfilled in MERT’s staff, the suggestion was fair enough, and the Russian authorities 
accepted it.  
When a Russian delegation finally set out for Washington, D.C., in September, 
representatives of the major Russian steel producers were included in the delegation as 
experts (Prokopenko 2000c). The consultations did not give any positive result for the 
Russian side. The Americans merely received the Russian suggestions and claimed to 
need two weeks to review them. It was clear that no answer would come until after the 
forthcoming American presidential elections (Prokopenko 2000d). 
3.4.3  Meetings and plans 
Meanwhile, relations between the industry and MERT were becoming closer. 
Trying to avoid past mistakes, the steel leaders and MERT representatives worked out 
a plan of how to meet anti-dumping investigations in the future. They also 
contemplated whether the Russian metals sector could be recognised as a market 
sector by the American trade authorities, in spite of the Russian economy retaining a 
non-market status (Kaika 2000a). Maksim Medvedkov, the responsible deputy 
minister in MERT, took an active role. He held meetings with representatives of the 
steel industry together with the Metallurgical Department of the Industry Ministry. 
This included a joint meeting in November, preceding a visit to Brussels and Paris for 
steel discussions with the United States and the European Union (Prokopenko 2000e). 
He also included some representatives of the steel industry in his delegation for this 
trip. The discussions, however, gave no result (Kaika 2000b). 
New meetings between MERT, the Industry Ministry and the steel leaders followed 
in December (Prokopenko 2000f). It was agreed to terminate the steel agreements 
unilaterally, at least the General Agreement, unless the American side agreed to the 
suggested changes to them before Christmas. A decision was to be made in January. 
On 11 January 2001, Medvedkov met with the steel leaders at MERT. Not only 
were the leaders of the Big Three there, representatives of the Medium Six were 
present as well. After all, the steel agreements affected all exporters. Most of them 
were in favour of terminating the General Agreement, but Severstal again spoke out 
against. The argument was that new anti-dumping investigations would follow in case 
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of termination. American producers would, according to this reasoning, be eager to 
make the most of any change to the status quo. Also, Severstal proposed that Russia 
should try its luck with the new American administration. NLMK’s deputy general 
director Andrei Petrosian doubted this, as George W. Bush’s administration reportedly 
was even more protectionist than Clinton’s administration had been (Prokopenko 
2001). With such disagreement among the steel exporters, the Russian government 
could not be convinced into action. Medvedkov was clearly in favour of some sort of 
renegotiation of the steel agreements, but how this was to happen remained unclear. 
Andrei Petrosian proved right. In June, President Bush requested the International 
Trade Commission to start anti-dumping investigations on steel against several 
countries, including Russia (Overchenko 2001). In July, the issue was discussed at a 
high level, when Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Trade Secretary Donald Evans, 
and Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill came to Moscow. Donald Evans met with 
German Gref, the Russian minister for economic development and trade, in October. 
As for the question of steel import, these meetings were inconclusive. 
3.4.4  American producers target imports again 
In October 2001, four major American steel producers again asked for 
countervailing import duties at 150 per cent for steel from several countries, including 
Russia. Later the same month, the ITC concluded that import from Russia and other 
countries did harm American producers, although dumping was not mentioned. The 
ITC’s work now concentrated on measures to be taken (Vlasova and Sas 2001). 
Towards the end of 2001, it became clear that the United States would again introduce 
high import duties, and perhaps quotas, to protect its domestic producers from foreign 
competition. At the same time, international talks about voluntary steel production 
reductions were held in Paris under OECD’s aegis. The talks were made more difficult 
by the ITC’s decision (Vinogradov and Rozhkova 2001). In January, a Department of 
Commerce delegation toured steel exporting countries to try to work out an 
international crisis agreement on steel. The tour, like the Paris talks, resulted in feeble 
promises from many states to reduce steel production somewhat.21 There was by now 
                                                 
21 Most notably Japan, where the economic contraction made this a virtue of necessity. 
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considerable uncertainty in the world steel market surrounding the possibility of a 
coming trade war on steel (Polit.ru 2001). 
3.4.5  Efforts to achieve market status for the metallurgical branch 
The major Russian steel producers knew that protectionist measures were coming. 
In late 2001, they applied for market status for the metallurgical branch of the Russian 
economy with the American Department of Commerce. This seemed to be intended to 
give some protection from American protectionism. A decision was awaited in May 
(Ivanov 2002a). This move had MERT’s approval: as noted above, it had been on the 
agenda between the state and the industry for some time. American steel companies 
sent their arguments against market status to the Russian metallurgical branch to the 
US Department of Commerce in January. The Russian trade representative in 
Washington D.C. recommended that the Russian government use the opportunity to 
file official counter-arguments. The government chose not to do so. However, MMK, 
NLMK and Severstal filed a letter with counter-arguments (Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt 
2002a). 
3.5  Safeguard measures 
The Russian government was informed informally about impending increases in US 
steel tariffs in mid-February, when Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov visited 
Washington. The Russian side had apparently been hoping for an exception for 
Russian producers, pointing to the steel agreements from 1999 and the US-Russian 
Trade Treaty from 1990. Such exceptions would be granted to steel producers from 
Mexico, Canada, Israel and Jordan: countries with which the United States had farther-
reaching trade agreements and treaties than Russia. Exceptions were also made for 
some smaller steel producing countries (Kaika 2002a; Butrin, Ivanov and Kotrelev 
2002). However, as the 1999 Russian-US steel agreements covered anti-dumping 
investigations only, and not general protectionism, they could not protect the Russians 
from the impending tariffs. On the other hand, had the American authorities wanted to, 
they could have interpreted the agreements differently. That they included Russian 
steel in their actions disappointed and surprised Russian authorities. 
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Maksim Medvedkov travelled to Washington directly after the Russian government 
received the information, but his efforts to achieve any kind of better terms for Russian 
steel failed. According to some observers, this was because there were no possible 
retaliatory measures to use as a stick, owing to the government’s soft position on the 
issue (Melikova 2002a). German Gref’s comment, “We are without defence”, reflected 
Russia’s lack of a market economy status with the American authorities (Melikova 
2002a). The Russian steel exporters as their last resort sent a letter to President Putin, 
asking him to discuss the topic with his American colleague (Melikova 2002a; Afonin 
and Pechik 2003 [interview]). Bush had the final word on the issue, and was expected 
to announce his decision by 6 March. 
On 5 March 2002, President Bush issued a proclamation on steel (President 2002). 
This proclamation introduced import duties ranging from 8 to 30 per cent, lasting for 3 
years and one day, for most steel products. There were some exceptions, mostly for 
special steels. Other products were from 20 March 2002 subject to tariff-rate quotas, 
meaning that the new duties were imposed only for imports that exceeded a new set of 
import quotas. The duties, which for most of the affected products were close to 30 per 
cent, and the quotas, were imposed as safeguard measures. A safeguard measure is a 
measure that, according to WTO regulations, can be imposed in an emergency, to 
protect a domestic industry from serious injury, or from threat of serious injury, when 
this is caused by increased imports from all sources. 
3.5.1  Losses and reactions 
Estimates of Russian losses were in the area of 300 to 500 million US dollars a 
year.22 Russian reactions came as it became known that safeguard measures would be 
introduced, and after the introduction as well. The issue of retaliatory measures entered 
the debate already in February, but became especially important after 5 March. There 
were calls for retaliatory measures from Duma politicians and the media. The steel 
producers’ comments to the press were mainly about estimated losses and general 
problems and outlooks in the metallurgic sector. However, some calls for retaliatory 
measures also came from the steel producers. Aleksei Mordashov on 6 March 
                                                 
22 Some publications cite larger numbers, without referring to sources. 
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demanded that the Russian government remove steel export duties, and that the 
government should “find adequate measures” (Skorobogat’ko 2002). This was the 
demand from major lobby groups and associations as well. For example, RSPP and the 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (TPPRF) officially announced that the Russian 
government should find counter-measures on 6 March (RSPP and TPPRF 2002). This 
was also the demand of the steel workers’ trade union, which demanded a consumer 
boycott of American chicken quarters (Goshchinskii 2003 [interview]). 
3.5.2  A trade war over steel and poultry? 
Many observers viewed the import ban on American poultry, announced 1 March 
but effective from 10 March, as a retaliatory measure. The Russian government on 
several occasions denied that there was any connection (e.g., RTR-Vesti.ru 2002a). 
Some saw it as a deliberate retaliatory measure (Vedomosti 2002a; Sivakov 2002). 
There were also allegations that it had been lobbied through by the prominent steel 
leader Vladimir Lisin (Vardul’ 2002). The opinion that the two questions were linked 
was shared by the afflicted American parties (Davleev 2003 [interview]), and by 
American authorities as well. This, in turn, was viewed as a step of confrontation by 
the Russian authorities (RTR-Vesti.ru 2002b), especially when the issue of American 
support for Russian WTO entry was drawn into the picture (Melikova 2002b). Others 
regarded the import ban as a possible negotiation card that was played too early by the 
Russian Ministry of Agriculture, displaying the uncoordinated nature of Russian trade 
policy (Vedomosti 2002a).  
The trade war over chicken and steel, as it was called in the Russian media, 
certainly served to attract attention to the problems of both steel producers and poultry 
producers. Indirectly, this may have served the steel producers well—as the president 
of the Russian Union of Metal Exporters smilingly phrased it,  
“Unfortunately, the state is far from being perfect. Our market was open, now it is closed 
to Ukrainian and Kazakh steel. The chicken legs were not used [as a retaliatory measure], 
but these chicken legs brought the question to the highest political level. (…) We just 
turned the President’s attention to the problems of steel export—what the Presidential 
Administration thought out afterwards is their issue. Nothing of that came from our side.” 
(Afonin in Afonin and Pechik 2003 [interview]). 
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3.6  Russian steel producers react 
3.6.1  Efforts to protect domestic markets 
The Russian steel producers concentrated on issues and areas where the Russian 
government could do something. One such area was steel export to Russia from 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan, against which MERT had initiated anti-dumping 
investigations in the autumn. The steel producers on 7 March asked MERT to 
introduce protective duties at above 40 per cent against some Ukrainian and Kazakh 
steels (Kaika 2002b; Vedomosti 2002b). In a meeting a few days later, the 
Commission for Protective Measures in Foreign Trade recommended that the 
government introduce from 21-36.9 per cent special import and anti-dumping duties 
on some Ukrainian and Kazakh steels for four months, as well as lift the 5 per cent 
export duties on steel from Russia (Smirnov 2002; Kaika 2002c). Two major goals of 
the steel producers were closer to being carried out than they had been before. Both the 
proposed measures would benefit several producers, not just the three large ones. And 
although the steel producers had asked for even higher duties to be introduced against 
Ukrainian and Kazakh steel, they were openly pleased with the speed with which their 
request had been treated (Kaika 2002c). 
3.6.2  Renewed unity among the large steel producers 
Clearly, the visible and sudden change of market conditions for the Russian steel 
business pushed its problems forward on the political agenda. This may also have been 
connected to new and better relations among the major steel enterprises and their 
leaders. Relations had not been altogether bad. According to one observer, there is not 
much rivalry in the steel business (Edwards 2003 [interview]). Still, during 2001, 
NLMK and EvrazHolding often aligned against MMK and Severstal.23 The four 
largest holdings in the Russian steel business had partly competing, partly reconcilable 
strategic interests. As a result, relations between them became increasingly complex in 
2001. Now, however, the external threat brought them closer on some issues. 
                                                 
23 In 2003, this changed, as EvrazHolding and Severstal seemed closer to broad cooperation, while NLMK and 
MMK planned a possible merger.  
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In a press conference on 19 March, the four steel leaders laid out their demands, 
veiled as expectations, to the Russian government. They demanded the termination of 
export duties; quotas and import duties for Ukrainian and Kazakh steel; that 
unprofitable steel enterprises should not be allowed to continue business, and 
negotiations to exclude Russia from the list of countries to which the United States 
applied the new special duties. The new factor here was not the demands themselves, 
nor the fact that they came from the steel producers. Instead, the joint press conference 
served to underline the gravity and urgency of the situation. As this was shortly after 
the meeting of the Commission for Protective Measures in Foreign Trade, they 
emphasised that they appreciated its recommendations, but were impatient to see them 
carried out. While accusing the government of inertia, they were eager to emphasise 
their loyalty to the same government (Butrin 2002). It appears that the four leaders 
wanted to take advantage of the attention the steel business had at the moment, to 
increase pressure on the government, and to underline the fact that these demands were 
unanimous. At the same time, they were afraid of appearing disloyal. They eagerly 
denied that they had political motives.  
3.6.3  A background of passivity 
The issue of protectionism against Russian steel export, whether through anti-
dumping procedures or otherwise, had been put firmly on the agenda during February 
and March 2002, in an unprecedented manner. In fact, such protectionism was a well-
known problem to Russian steel producers in the 1990s as well, and it is puzzling that 
it took so long to attract attention. It may be connected to another puzzling feature: 
Russian steel companies faced with anti-dumping charges in different countries were 
rather unwilling to take up the fight, trying instead to avoid investigation altogether 
through negotiation for quotas. This had, in turn, lead to many lost cases for Russian 
steel exporters when negotiations failed (Ivanov 2002a). It also made them dependent 
on the Russian negotiators in charge when they were faced with counterparts that had 
not awarded them market status. Altogether, it seemed they had been too passive 
(Ivanov 2002b). Examples of such passivity exist also in other Russian industries; for 
example, Lehmbruch (2001: 162-163) cites an example from paper export to India. 
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3.6.4  Unilateral termination of the General Agreement 
State actors too had shaken off their former passivity. This had been a problem with 
the old Ministry of Trade, more than anyone else. MERT was more active in 
promoting and supporting Russian steel interests abroad. Now, the steel business’s 
renewed attention to export terms met with broader government activity towards the 
steel business. First, German Gref went to Washington on 15 April, both to try to 
achieve better terms for Russian steel, and with an approach to return American 
chicken to the Russian market. He was also ready to threaten Russian unilateral 
termination of the 1999 General Agreement on steel (Sas 2002a; 2002b). The US 
International Trade Commission had just a few days previously ruled that Russian 
cold-rolled steel was a threat to American producers: 100 per cent import duties would 
be levied from 26 April. This was on top of the duties imposed in March.  
The negotiations did not give any significant result. The Americans reserved 25 per 
cent of the steel slab import quota exempted from special duties, for Russian slabs. 
The overall quota was also increased. This decision appears to have been made in late 
March, and announced during the visit (Blinov 2002). It was not an act of 
compensation towards Russian steel producers. Rather, it reflected that American 
production could not satisfy the demand for slabs in its domestic market.  
As Gref went back to Moscow, he had already informed the Americans that the 
Russians would terminate the General Agreement (Sas 2002c). His deputy, Maksim 
Medvedkov, in mid-May stated that Russia would terminate the General Agreement no 
matter what would then happen to the suspension agreement on hot-rolled steel. 
However, the four major steel leaders reconsidered their interests, and in a letter to 
Gref warned against terminating the General Agreement. This came the week after 
Medvedkov’s statement (Kaika 2002e). The reason for the turn-about was again the 
fear that with a termination of the General Agreement, the suspension agreement on 
hot-rolled steel would automatically be invalidated. This would leave Russian steel 
producers exposed to dumping charges from American producers (Kaika 2002e). In 
addition, prices for hot-rolled steel were rising, making the terms of the latter 
agreement more bearable (Vedomosti 2002c).  
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The termination process was halted. The four major steel producers became 
unpopular with others in the industry, who exported steels other than hot-rolled to the 
US. Aleksei Ivanushkin, chairman of Mechel, later in the year cited this as an example 
of the Russian authorities listening only to the three largest steel producers when 
deciding on issues important to the steel business in general (Auzan 2002). The 
Mechel management would later in the year delay the process of distributing steel 
export quotas between Russian exporters for this reason, as will be discussed below. 
The steel leaders’ inability to compromise on the issue of termination may also have 
served to reduce support of their interests on the part of MERT. 
3.6.5  A government programme for industry development 
However, German Gref’s journey to Washington was not the government’s only 
effort to meet the steel producers’ demands. By mid-May, the Mining and 
Metallurgical Union and the People’s Deputy faction in the Duma had supported these 
demands. The Industry Ministry in April started to prepare a government programme 
for development of the ferro-metallurgical sector. To influence the programme, the 
Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs submitted an analysis of measures needed to 
preserve Russian steel producers’ competitiveness (RSPP 2002). The programme 
project was discussed in a cabinet meeting on 16 May. The programme had been 
pushed upwards on the agenda. All the major steel producers were present at the 
cabinet meeting, and expressed their opinions both during it and afterwards.  
The programme, in this first version prepared by the Industry Ministry, was 
apparently in accord with the steel makers’ demands. To a considerable extent, it 
reflected the RSPP’s analysis as well. Unprofitable enterprises should be declared 
bankrupt, the domestic market should be developed, Ukrainian steel should become 
subject to import restrictions,24 and the environment tax and some tariffs, like the one 
on energy, should be reduced for metallurgical enterprises (Minpromnauki 2002a; 
Netreba 2002b). Although it was based on their own demands, the steel producers 
declared that they were not satisfied with the programme. Their main objection was 
that it was not detailed enough. Although it received the cabinet’s endorsement, it was 
                                                 
24 Kazakh steel was far less likely to be subject to such measures, as this would violate agreements on free trade 
between the two countries. 
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returned to the Industry Ministry for elaboration and details. This could change the 
programme significantly. Disagreements within the cabinet during the session made 
this more likely. Some criticism also accused this of being too little, too late—the 
business had asked for it more than a year earlier (Arabov 2002a).  
3.6.6  Declarations of government support are followed up 
Meanwhile, it took considerable time to carry out earlier promises. The termination 
of the steel export tax met with severe resistance from the Ministry of Finances (Kaika 
2002d). This resistance was overcome only by joint efforts from Aleksei Mordashov 
of Severstal and German Gref (Netreba 2002a). It was further delayed on its way 
through the government by objections from Prime Minister Mikhail Kasianov, and was 
not made effective until 1 July.  
The long-awaited and newly (re-)promised restrictions on Ukrainian and Kazakh 
steel imports were also slow to appear. The steel leaders raised the issue again in a 
letter to Prime Minister Kasianov (Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt 2002b). Only from 1 
August did 31-37 per cent import duties on galvanised steel come into function 
(Kuz’min 2002; Kaika and Simakov 2002).25 A previously initiated anti-dumping 
process against steel bars from the same countries was also proceeding, but very 
slowly. Duties proposed for other steels were not put into action, but minimum prices 
were imposed. All in all, the government’s apparent new attention to the steel business 
was slow to give substantial results. 
3.7  Russia is designated a market economy 
A domino effect of the American decision on the world steel market, of which 
experts and the steel business had been warning since March, lead to market protection 
not only in Russia. In May, China as well introduced quotas for Russian steel (Orlov 
2002). The problems for Russian steel producers seemed more acute than ever, as 
China was a very important market. 
President Bush visited Moscow and St. Petersburg on 23-26 May. Many observers 
expected him to announce during the summit that the United States recognised Russia 
                                                 
25 These duties were substantially lowered already at the end of 2002 (MERT 2003). 
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as a market economy, but this did not happen. However, the issues of steel and poultry 
were discussed between the two presidents, underlining the importance they had 
acquired in the bilateral relationship. On 6 June, the crucial announcement came from 
the US Department of Commerce’s Import Administration: Russia was designated a 
market economy retroactively from 1 April. This was one week after a similar 
announcement had been made by the European Union.  
The designation as a market economy gave Russian steel exporters far better 
opportunities to defend their interests against American authorities and steel producers 
directly, as they no longer had to go through Russian authorities in negotiations and 
anti-dumping investigations. Also, the new designation meant that American 
authorities no longer regarded Russian companies as implicitly subsidised by the state. 
This would strengthen the Russian case when faced with charges of dumping, because 
the Americans would have to use actual Russian price data when determining whether 
Russian goods were sold in the United States at unfairly low prices. Until now, the 
Americans had estimated what the price would have been in a market economy. On 
the other hand, the change of designation could mean a larger number of investigations 
and countervailing duty cases, because overtly subsidised Russian products were now 
always subject to countervailing duties in the United States. 
Russian steel producers were not slow to ask for an agreement to escape the anti-
dumping duties that the United States had threatened to impose on cold-rolled steel 
from April. Severstal, MMK and NLMK first met the Department of Commerce in 
mid-June. On the first issue, documentation required by the American authorities, the 
negotiations ended with a result that favoured the Russian enterprises. This 
documentation would be used to establish the cost levels of the enterprises, and 
accordingly, the minimum price on the American market (Arabov 2002b). The 
Russian producers wanted documentation to be given every six months, and not every 
three months, as the Department of Commerce would like. In the end, they agreed on 
every six months. 
In September, the negotiations ended in a draft agreement about Russian sales of 
cold-rolled steel for the next five years (Department of Commerce 2002). After a 
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moratorium of nine months, beginning on 1 January 2003, imports would increase 
every year. Many of the technicalities and requirements to documentation and 
inspections were clearly the ones favoured by the Russian producers (Simakov and 
Neimysheva 2002; Simakov 2002c). 
The cold-rolled steel agreement from September became obsolete already in 
October. The anti-dumping investigation ended with the decision that cold-rolled steel 
was not dumped on the American market (Simakov 2002d). But the experience of 
negotiating an agreement directly with the American authorities had shown the three 
large Russian steel producers that they could manage on their own. Similar direct 
negotiations soon followed on hot-rolled thick plate between the American authorities, 
Severstal, MMK and the medium steel producer NOSTA. The resulting agreement was 
very similar to that on cold-rolled steel (Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt 2002g). 
Certainly, conditions for Russian steel on the US market were becoming better 
every day. Some of the steel products that had originally been subjected to the 
safeguard measures in March were excluded from the list as domestic American 
production failed to meet demand. Between April and September, this applied to more 
than 178 steel types (Strana.ru 2002). In addition, overall quotas for slabs were 
increased several times during 2002 and 2003, meaning that increasing volumes of 
slabs were exempted from the high duties. In November 2002, specific Russian quotas 
for slabs were increased in an amendment to the General Agreement. 
3.8  Developments in Russia after the market economy status 
3.8.1  The government programme 
The Industry Ministry had prepared the second version of the programme for 
development of the metallurgical industry by early July (Minpromnauki 2002b). The 
emphasis on closing down ineffective, obsolete and unprofitable enterprises, a priority 
of the ministry, was even more pronounced than in the first version. Andrei Petrosian 
from NLMK accused the new programme of being too general, and not geared towards 
grappling with the real problems of the steel business (Simakov 2002a).  
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The Prime Minister approved the programme on 5 September. The two months that 
had passed since the Industry Ministry finished its second version had been used to 
change the programme substantially. It had become much shorter, and far less specific. 
The emphasis on closing down obsolete mills, like those with open-hearth furnaces, 
was gone. This was now one of many goals, and how it was to be achieved remained 
unclear (Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt 2002c). One new goal was included: to strengthen 
anti-monopoly control in the metal market (Pravitel’stvo RF 2002). A price rise on 
automobile steel imposed simultaneously by the three major producers on 1 July was 
probably to a reason for including this in the programme. The three producers had 
been accused of price cooperation, and had come under investigation by the Ministry 
for Anti-Monopoly Policies (Rozhkova 2002a; Simakov 2002b; Vedomosti 2002d).  
3.8.2  The quota controversy 
From July to November 2002, the issue of how export quotas to the European 
Union and United States were to be distributed between Russian exporters created 
much controversy among the steel producers. It started when MMK asked for a 30 per 
cent increase to its EU quota in June (Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt 2002d). This spurred 
disagreement between MERT and the Industry Ministry. MERT as an answer 
proposed a new mechanism for quota allotment in general, based on a set formula that 
favoured the larger exporters. Previously, quotas had been recommended by SEMPR 
to the Industry Ministry, on the basis of deliveries in previous years. Now MERT 
officials wanted to exclude the “human factor” (Kaika 2002f). In the following 
controversies, the Industry Ministry and MMK (which could more easily gain 30 per 
cent under the old quota system) aligned against MERT, NLMK and Severstal (these 
two enterprises would fare well with the new methods). Finally, the issue of 2002 
quotas was settled within the framework of SEMPR, using both old and the new 
methods (Rozhkova 2002b).  
However, the controversy continued as the quota system from 2003 onwards 
became the source of even more discussion. When SEMPR, under the aegis of which 
the quota question again was solved, proposed a new mechanism in September, 
Mechel’s representative dissented. His disagreement was not as much rooted in the 
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actual proposal, as in discontent with the 1999 steel agreements with the United States. 
He openly complained that Mechel leadership’s opinion had not been taken into 
account when the Russian side after all did not terminate the General Agreement on 
Steel in May (Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt 2002d).  
Because of the dissent, Medvedkov in November proposed that quotas be auctioned 
off, much to the chagrin of all the steel producers and the Industry Ministry 
(Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt 2002e).26 In the end, Mechel gave in, but the controversy 
had exposed how difficult it was to reconcile the various steel business interests 
(Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt 2002f). 
3.9  Developments in 2003 
Throughout 2003, Russian and American authorities kept signing agreements about 
increasing slab quotas for Russian producers. The General Agreement and the 
suspension agreement on hot-rolled steel expired in July 2003. This did not make 
much of a difference to Russian producers for many of the steels they exported to the 
United States, as several of the safeguard measures from March 2002 remained in 
force.  
Many of the countries that were subject to the safeguard measures were also 
members of the WTO, and some of these countries complained to the WTO in June 
2002.27 The complaints, and the consistency of the safeguard measures introduced by 
the US administration with WTO regulations, were reviewed in a panel, according to 
WTO procedures for such complaints. The panel found in favour of the plaintiffs in 
July 2002. The United States submitted an appeal, but the WTO Appellate Body in 
November 2003 again found in favour of the plaintiffs. This eventually influenced the 
US presidential administration to withdraw the safeguard measures in December 2003.  
                                                 
26 This would be expensive for the steel producers. Auctions are a measure of last resort in export (as well as 
import) policy. They do not promote transparency, and give better opportunities for unfair practice. Auctions are 
against WTO recommendations. 
27 The plaintiffs were the European Union, Japan, South Korea, China, Norway, Switzerland, New Zealand, and 
Brazil. 
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Russian government policy on the steel business in general in 2003 seemed to 
develop towards more assistance and support in export markets, but not more outright 
protection of the domestic market (e.g., Promyshlennyi ezhenedel’nik 2003).  
3.10  This case in light of the core question 
The analysis is divided into three parts. First, I describe the network in the case. 
Next, I discuss how one may understand the steel case in light of the models outlined 
in the theoretical chapter. And lastly, I discuss factors that may have influenced 
changes in the network.  
3.10.1  The network in this case 
Actors 
Who were the actors? In this case, there were several business actors, and some 
state actors. On the government side, the Ministry of Trade was replaced by MERT in 
May 2000. MERT was one of the most central state actors in the case. MERT’s 
Department of Trade Policy and Multilateral Negotiations was in charge of the 
bilateral negotiations, and Deputy Minister Maksim Medvedkov was responsible from 
MERT’s leadership. Medvedkov took an interest in the case, and worked hard during 
negotiations. Medvedkov also seemed to coordinate some aspects of steel policy in the 
period. German Gref assumed responsibility at the cabinet level. At times, he also 
participated in negotiations with the United States. A general conclusion is that MERT 
was more active in both bilateral negotiations and in general policy issues than the 
earlier Ministry of Trade had been.  
The main actor on overall steel policy was the Industry Ministry’s Department of 
Metallurgy. The department’s head, Andrei Deineko, and Deputy Head Vladimir 
Lavrishchev, were quite active and often issued public statements. The department had 
responsibility for policy-making and coordination for the steel business. It worked out 
the government programme, and the Industry Ministry alone developed the second 
version of the programme. In addition to ties with steel enterprises and business 
associations as well as state agencies, the Department of Metallurgy also consulted the 
Coordination Council for the Metallurgical Complex, which is discussed below. The 
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most visible representative of the Industry Ministry’s political leadership was the 
deputy industry minister responsible for metallurgy, Sergei Mitin.  
Among the less central state actors, the Commission for Protective Measures in 
Foreign Trade was important to the steel business’ efforts to reduce imports from 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The commission coordinated trade policy implementation at 
cabinet level, and amended import regulation and taxation. It had members from 
several ministries, including Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin. Kudrin and Gref were 
the commission’s co-chairs.  
The cabinet itself became directly involved in the case when it came to the 
government programme for development of the metallurgical industry. Prime Minister 
Kasianov stood out as rather important here. Kasianov allowed the Ministry for Anti-
Monopoly Policies and other government agencies to influence the programme’s final 
version, and he took an active interest in the contents of the programme (Simakov 
2002b). However, the cabinet cannot be seen as a part of the steel network.  
The most visible business actors in the case were the enterprises Severstal, MMK, 
and NLMK, or more precisely, their managements. EvrazHolding became increasingly 
important in 2001-2002. At times, it seemed that only these three or four enterprise 
managements had access to the state actors in the case. On the one hand, Severstal, 
MMK and NLMK were the enterprises that were accused of dumping steel on the 
American market in the first place. This was connected with their being by far the 
most important exporters. Therefore, they were asked for advice, and had more contact 
with Russian authorities on the matter. On the other hand, the 1999 agreements were 
binding also for other enterprises that exported steel to the United States. This was the 
background on which Mechel’s management accused the authorities of taking into 
account only the advice of the major three steel producers.  
Did the influence of the major three approximate a representational monopoly in the 
case? There was no formal representational monopoly. But as far as the authorities 
only asked for the advice of the major three enterprise managements, while 
agreements affected other enterprises as well, there was in effect limited representation 
of business interests. Other managements may have been asked to contribute, but 
 58 
 
chosen not to, preferring instead to be free riders on the major three’s efforts and 
expenses. In any event, the effect was a narrower interest representation.  
At times, for example when Medvedkov met with the steel leaders to discuss 
possible termination of the General Agreement in January 2001, it seemed that 
participation from the medium six steel producers was required more for purposes of 
legitimation and wider consultation, than negotiation and cooperation. This changed 
towards the end of 2001, when EvrazHolding started to participate more. Mechel’s 
dissent on the steel quotas in the second half of 2002 may from this point of view have 
been a bid to be included among the more important participants.  
This does not mean that the three or four major steel leaders always acted together, 
or according to common interests. They disagreed just as often. As mentioned, 
common political and strategic interests in 2001 led to an alignment of sorts between 
NLMK and EvrazHolding on one side, and MMK and Severstal on the other. The dire 
conditions on steel markets in Russia and abroad united them at certain times in 2001 
and 2002. Steel export to the United States, and also to the European Union, provided 
them with some points of shared interests, and there were also other issues, like WTO 
accession and the government programme for metallurgy. However, the major steel 
business actors frequently disagreed. But with all their disagreements, they functioned 
in the network as an informal and imperfect representational monopoly. 
SEMPR, the Union of Metals Exporters, was also an actor in the network. This was 
the business association for steel exporters. Its members in the steel business 
represented 90 per cent of total Russian steel production. SEMPR most importantly 
allotted export quotas, and in this capacity it was in contact with its members as well 
as state agencies. Its premises were often the venue for the steel exporters’ meetings.28 
At the first glance, SEMPR was a business actor. On closer investigation, it appears to 
have been more of a broker that mediated contacts. It seems that membership of 
SEMPR brought steel producers one more channel for presenting interests to state 
agencies, more than an arena for pursuing collective interests. In fact, SEMPR 
channelled access to a wide variety of state institutions. It forwarded experts to the 
                                                 
28 A premium piece of real estate in central Moscow, the House of Metallurgists previously housed the Soviet 
Ministry of Metallurgy, later the Russian Federation’s Committee for Metallurgy. 
 59 
 
Duma Committees on Industry, Construction, Science and Technology, and on 
Economic Policy and Enterprise. Serafim Afonin,29 the president of SEMPR, chaired 
the Coordination Council of the Metallurgical Complex, which channelled access to 
the Industry Ministry. It seems that SEMPR as a channel for business to state agencies 
mediated first and foremost the interests of the major steel producers, as the medium 
and small producers participated less. However, it is hard to say whether this reflected 
the major producers’ export interests, or whether the smaller producers were left out 
on purpose.  
It is also important that the Mining and Metallurgical Union (GMPR) was not a 
member of this network. GMPR was a relatively influential union in the Russian 
context. During the period under study, it pursued a varied strategy of demonstrations, 
calls for boycotts, and letters to influence Russian authorities to support Russian steel 
export. At no point did it participate in the network that formed to manage this issue.  
Functions 
What did the actors do? On this dimension, the network developed in the period 
under study. During the negotiations with the US authorities in 1999, there was little 
contact initially between the Ministry of Trade and business actors. The Ministry of 
Trade did not consult the affected businesses, and the business leaders complained of 
little support. They did not participate in delegations to the bilateral negotiations. Of 
course, the non-market economy status of Russia meant that business representatives 
were not formally allowed to participate. But business representatives could have been 
informally included in delegations as consultants, even more so as the Ministry of 
Trade was severely understaffed. There was more consultation between state and 
business towards the end of the negotiations, at least according to Aleksei Mordashov.  
This situation changed during 2000. That summer, the three major steel producers 
contacted the new ministry in charge of the process, MERT, with the object of starting 
a renegotiation process for the bilateral agreements. The ministry swiftly reacted to the 
request. This became the start of another phase in the state-business relationship. Now 
                                                 
29 Afonin was chairman of the Russian Federation’s Committee for Metallurgy from 1993 to 1996 (Fortescue 
1997), and became president of SEMPR in 1997. In 1996, the state committees were subsumed into the Ministry 
of Industry. Their functions were in April 1998 taken over by the new Ministry of Industry and Trade. Following 
more reorganisations in 1999, the Industry Ministry was created in May 2000. 
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the business actors had access to MERT, and were included in delegations to the 
bilateral negotiations in September 2000. There were continuous consultation and 
numerous meetings between these actors, and several instances of strategy 
development in cooperation between state and business. This applied to the strategy 
for achieving renegotiation, and the strategy for meeting anti-dumping investigations 
in the future. In late 2000 and early 2001, these actors discussed whether to pursue 
unilateral termination of the General Agreement. Following this, they in 2001 
developed a strategy for applying for market sector status of the metallurgical branch 
of the Russian economy with the US authorities.  
However, after Russia was designated a market economy by American authorities 
in June 2002, the Russian exporters approached the relevant US agencies directly, 
without consulting Russian authorities. State-business cooperation, until then 
indispensable for attaining any result in bilateral negotiations, became superfluous. 
This meant that the network became less important: it lost some of its functions. 
Quite a few functions were still carried out in the network. SEMPR remained in 
charge of some implementation tasks and coordination functions in steel export. First 
and foremost, this was the distribution of export quotas among exporters. SEMPR also 
monitored compliance with the quota restrictions. Both these tasks implied a 
delegation of public authority to SEMPR. Indeed, it could well be a holdover from the 
time when the Committee for Metallurgy carried out these tasks under Afonin’s 
chairmanship. These functions were present throughout the case. SEMPR was 
especially important during the quota controversy, which it worked actively to settle 
with a new principle for distributing the quotas.  
Structure 
How was the state-business network structured? On this dimension as well, there 
was development in the network. Membership was not constant. The Ministry of Trade 
was incorporated into MERT in May 2000. EvrazHolding became a participant in the 
second half of 2001. This was not a large network, and as previously discussed, there 
was a tendency towards limited representation on the business side. This was 
supplemented by brokerage provided by SEMPR. The boundaries of the network 
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accordingly seemed closed. The second half of 2002 may have brought more 
flexibility into network membership.  
Nevertheless, the most obvious change in the network structure occurred from 1999 
to 2000. The frequency of interaction between the state and the business actors 
increased: meetings became more regular. As business actors were included in 
delegations, the duration of interaction necessarily increased. The content changed, as 
described above under functions.  
The network seemed to be linked by horizontal consultation, and increasingly so. 
For example, the important inclusion of business representatives into delegations for 
bilateral negotiation indicated that the relationship became more horizontal than in a 
strictly hierarchical relationship. Consultation between state and business actors 
before, but not during negotiations, as was the case in early 1999, indicated a more 
hierarchical relationship. And further, in the process of working out a plan to have the 
General Agreement renegotiated the actors seemed to consult each other horizontally. 
However, interlocking leaderships, like for example the widespread participation of 
SEMPR’s president, Serafim Afonin, point towards a more hierarchical system. It is 
therefore difficult to draw conclusions on this issue. It could be that within the sector 
in general, actors interacted in a hierarchical way; while between the most central 
actors from the major enterprises and ministries, interaction was more horizontal. 
Actors were also linked by multiple relations. For example, according to standard 
procedures, the Industry Ministry was supposed to be in charge of contact with steel 
business actors, while MERT should keep enterprise directors updated mainly through 
the Industry Ministry. However, some business actors were informed directly of 
developments by MERT, and these enterprise directors kept in closer contact with 
MERT than others. Sometimes they also received information earlier than those who 
were informed through official letters only (Zaitseva 2003 [interview]). 
There were multiple channels of access. Some contact was channelled through 
MERT’s Trade and Economic Council, where SEMPR President Afonin held the 
deputy chairmanship. Another example is the Coordination Council for the 
Metallurgical Complex, which consisted of the main general directors of the larger 
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Russian metallurgical enterprises, and a few leaders of research institutions.30 This 
council met with Industry Ministry officials at regular intervals, but apparently not 
more than one or two times a year. The council appeared more of an arena for 
discussion and contact than for policymaking and coordination. Its more prominent 
members, for example the big three and Mr. Afonin, met each other, and Industry 
Ministry officials, outside the council anyhow. Such meetings more specifically 
related to current problems and their solutions than issues discussed in the 
coordination council.  
Coordination councils between steel producers and particular customers were a 
regular feature of business-to-business contact (Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt 2003a; 
2003b). These councils represented a recognised form of discussion, problem solving, 
and exchange of information between different actors in the steel business. State 
agencies could also participate, for example the Ministry for Transport and 
Communication (Metallosnabzhenie i sbyt 2003c). Coordination councils appeared to 
be integral to interest mediation in the steel business.  
But steel business actors did not rely only on the above-discussed channels into 
state agencies. For the major steel producers, coordination committees and SEMPR 
were only supplements to direct ties with state agencies and actors.31  
Institutionalisation 
To what extent was the network institutionalised and formalised? A network can 
have a high degree of institutionalisation without being very formalised. The 
coordination councils discussed above represent a formalisation of access channels, 
but in general, this network had a tendency towards informal channels. Additionally, 
informal meetings were more frequent than meetings in formalised channels, like the 
Coordination Council for the Metallurgical Complex. 
The meetings of the three major steel producers, representatives of MERT, and the 
Industry Ministry constituted an important informal channel. This channel was a 
central and informal feature of the network. Participation, especially from the Industry 
                                                 
30 The council was created in July 1997 by the Department of the Metallurgical Complex Economy of the then 
Ministry of Economy. In the period under study, it had around 30 members. 
31 Fortescue gives interesting examples of direct ties both in the Soviet period and the 1990s (1997: 150). 
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Ministry, appeared to be dependent on the circumstances. For example, in November 
2000, Industry Ministry representatives participated in a meeting preceding 
negotiations in Brussels and Paris. At a meeting in January 2001 that treated possible 
termination of the General Agreement, the Industry Ministry did not participate. The 
channel was institutionalised only after MERT had replaced the old Ministry of Trade. 
Meetings were regular already in the autumn of 2000. Before this, contact was more 
intermittent, and not always in the form of meetings. Because this channel was so 
important, one may say that while institutionalisation was low before the summer of 
2000, it was somewhat higher after this, when meetings were regularised. 
Power relations 
How autonomous was the state in this relationship? Did initiatives and decisions 
reflect one side of the relationship more than the other side? It is difficult to assess 
state autonomy in the intermittent contact of the beginning of the case. However, the 
period of more regular contact that started in the second half of 2000 can be divided 
into two parts when it comes to power relations. Until the start of 2002, there was 
regular consultation between the state and the steel business. This consultation resulted 
in plans and strategies that reflected common interests. State autonomy was not 
compromised. The first half of 2002 brought three incidents in which the state may 
have been less autonomous towards the steel business, and they merit discussion. 
The first was the question of retaliatory measures after the introduction of safeguard 
measures in the United States. Did the import ban on poultry, if it was such a 
retaliatory measure, indicate low state autonomy? Of course, it remains doubtful 
whether this was a retaliatory measure at all. Even if the import ban on poultry was a 
retaliatory measure, it was imposed by veterinary, not trade, authorities. Therefore, the 
ban as a retaliatory measure implied participation at a higher level than that of 
MERT’s political leadership. In that case, the question of state autonomy here is 
pertinent to another level of the state. Could the steel business have influenced the 
government, or the Kremlin, to impose the ban? This cannot be ruled out. However, it 
is more likely that the timing was coincidental, and that steel business actors and 
others who commented on the issue deliberately preserved some ambiguity to draw 
attention to steel export. Also, SEMPR’s president (Afonin in Afonin and Pechik 2003 
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[interview]) indicated that the poultry import ban brought attention also to steel export 
from the highest political level, which means the president and his administration. This 
is discussed in more detail on pages 47 and 81. 
Secondly, there was the termination of the General Agreement. The agreement was 
terminated in April 2002 as requested by some actors in the steel business, especially 
NLMK’s management. In May 2002, the termination process was halted, following 
what seemed to be a turn-about from the steel business. Rising prices for hot-rolled 
steel might explain the change of mind, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Did the end 
to the termination process imply a lack of state autonomy? It is important to take into 
account for whose benefit the termination process was initiated. Leaving aside the 
question of disagreement between steel business leaders, it is clear that termination of 
the General Agreement was meant to benefit them, not state policy. That the 
termination process was halted after the steel leaders’ change of mind can be seen as a 
consequence of taking their advice into account in the first place. After all, if the 
state’s efforts to support Russian businesses abroad were to remain credible, the 
termination process had to be halted. Therefore, this could have been more a question 
of maintaining a credible pledge to support Russian business than to preserve state 
autonomy at all costs.  
Thirdly, there was the government programme for development of the ferro-
metallurgical sector. The first and second versions of it, prepared by the Industry 
Ministry, reflected long-time demands made by the steel business. The third and final 
version was markedly different. This version reflected overall political goals of the 
government more than the previous two versions, which were written from a sectoral 
point of view. But the real question is whether the steel business actors influenced the 
first two versions to such an extent that it compromised state autonomy. The steel 
business had ample chance to influence the programme, through the RSPP’s analysis, 
and through meetings with Industry Ministry officials. Of course, the steel business 
and the Industry Ministry may have had quite similar priorities and viewpoints. Still, I 
think that the government programme indicated that the steel business had an influence 
on the Industry Ministry that restricted its autonomy as a state agency. 
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In sum, I think that power relations may have changed slightly in the last period of 
the case, to a situation in which state autonomy was lower than it had been before.  
Strategies of public administration 
Were the state agencies accessible to business actors? Did they actively support 
business associations? In general, it seems that state agencies were accessible to 
business actors, but the situation before mid-2000 may have been different as regards 
the Ministry of Trade. There was also delegation of public authority to SEMPR. These 
two issues are central to this dimension. 
Before mid-2000, it seems that business actors had problems with gaining access to 
the Ministry of Trade. When the three large steel leaders contacted MERT in mid-
2000, they were granted access, and state-business relations in the network changed. 
But did the lack of access to the Ministry of Trade represent a conscious strategy from 
this agency? No answers can be certain here. It seems, however, that it was a 
conscious strategy from the Ministry of Trade to exclude steel business actors from 
direct contact with US state agencies. This could reflect a strategy of restricted access 
to state agencies. At the very least, there was not free access for business actors to the 
Ministry of Trade. This changed visibly when MERT succeeded the Ministry of Trade. 
MERT pursued a strategy of being accessible for business actors. This accessibility 
seems restricted to the more important steel business actors. 
Public authority was delegated to SEMPR as regards export quotas throughout the 
case. There were no changes here. Did this reflect a conscious strategy from state 
agencies? In SEMPR’s case, the authority to decide export quotas for each exporter 
can be said to be a holdover from the Committee of Metallurgy. Then it is less 
accurate to call it a strategy of the Ministry of Trade within the time period under 
study here.  
All in all, it seems that the strategy of one of the state agencies in this case was to be 
accessible after mid-2000. Before this time, the Ministry of Trade was less accessible, 
and this seems to reflect a strategy.  
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3.10.2  The network in steel and the models 
How may one understand the case in light of the models outlined in chapter two? To 
start with the clan model, it includes one major interest group with an informal 
representational monopoly, a network with many functions, closed boundaries and 
horizontal consultation. Multiple relations link actors, and their contacts are intense 
and stable. They are also institutionalised to a high extent, and state agencies could be 
captured, but this is not necessary. Is it useful to see the steel network as a clan at any 
point? There are two persuasive arguments against this. Firstly, it is an exaggeration to 
say that the three major steel producers formed one major interest group with an 
informal representational monopoly. Their internal disagreements were well known 
and a central feature of the case. However, membership in the network was restricted 
until 2002. So while there were disagreements within the network, dissent from 
without the network was not directly voiced within it. Secondly, one cannot say that 
the network had high density, intensity or stability, as would be the case in a clan. The 
density, intensity and stability in the steel network increased from mid-2000 to mid-
2002, but seemed to be at a medium level, rather than high. On the other hand, de facto 
restrictions on membership, possibly supported by the state agencies in question; 
medium intensity and institutionalisation, and horizontal coordination are features that 
support the view of this network as a clan between mid-2000 and mid-2002. However, 
this is at best an imperfect description. 
Could one usefully see this as a state capture network? In this model, there are a 
limited number of firms and more fluent boundaries, but the network has many 
functions. Importantly, intensity is lower than in a clan, and state agencies are captured 
by business interests. The last point is a problem here. As discussed above, business 
interests in 2002 could be seen to restrict the autonomy of state agencies. I still argue 
that this was not the case to the extent that one may speak of capture. Otherwise, many 
features of a state capture model seem to give a good understanding of the steel 
network: for example, medium intensity and density, the wide range of possible 
functions, and the limited number of firms. It is important to note that a state capture 
network has no room for a business association like SEMPR. However, as mentioned 
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above, one cannot overlook the possibility that SEMPR mediated the interests of the 
larger producers at the expense of smaller producers’ interests. 
Are loose networking patterns perhaps a good description of the steel network? This 
model has room for interest brokers like SEMPR, while the structure is more fluent 
and less integrated. This could be a good model through which to study the earliest 
part of this case: the period until mid-2000. However, one cannot say of this period 
that boundaries were fluent. They were well defined, and membership was restricted. 
On the other hand, relations within the network seemed to be like those of a loose 
networking pattern, but only until mid-2000. 
What, then, about elite exchange? In elite exchange, there are more functions, and a 
more stable and intense, and institutionalised structure, than in loose networking 
patterns. Brokerage is also possible. Power is equally distributed between state and 
business actors: this is a reciprocal relationship. However, in the steel network, there 
did not seem to be an explicitly reciprocal relationship, or a strong notion of quid pro 
quo-exchange between the state and business elites. It seems like a general exchange 
of cooperation and consultation, in which the state preserved its autonomy. 
Accordingly, the steel network cannot be seen as an elite exchange network.  
The steel network, then, was something in-between a clan and a loose networking 
pattern. It had restricted membership: not open, as in loose networking patterns, but 
not thoroughly monopolistic, as in clans. It displayed a wide range of functions, and 
the number increased in the period under study. In that respect, it was more like a clan 
than a loose networking pattern. There was a demand for brokerage, but not on all 
issues. State agencies were autonomous, and business actors did have quite a bit of 
influence. Coordination was more of the horizontal than the hierarchical type, but this 
changed in the period. The network also changed from a low-intensity, low-density 
structure to one with medium intensity and density. The same goes for 
institutionalisation. The network changed during the case, and it seems that it changed 
from a network somewhat similar to a loose networking pattern, to a network that 
looked more like a clan. However, it was rather less intense than a clan, and there was 
not a perfect monopoly on interest representation. But not all interests were mediated 
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to the same extent: the major three steel producers had their interests brokered in more 
ways, and in more efficient ways, than the smaller ones. When the network changed 
again in mid-2002, intensity decreased, and the previously restricted boundaries of the 
network became less restricted. Therefore, it became less clan-like, but otherwise 
retained essential features. 
3.10.3  Influences on the network 
From the above discussion of the networks, I conclude that this is indeed a network 
in change. Until the middle of 2000, this was a partly closed network with low 
intensity and intermittent contact, few functions (mainly consultation) and a low level 
of institutionalisation. From the middle of 2000 to and including the first half of 2002, 
it was a partly closed network with frequent contact, a higher level of 
institutionalisation, and many functions, including cooperation and coordination. And 
after the first half of 2002, its previously restricted membership became more open, 
while contact became less intense and the network lost some of its functions. In 
addition, state autonomy declined slightly at this point. 
Can any outside changes have influenced the network to change? Changes in the 
American steel market could be a point of departure here. The American market 
changed in a major way twice: when it became in effect a rather restricted market for 
Russian steel in mid-1999, and when it was more or less completely closed in March 
2002. Both after mid-1999 and March 2002, the network also changed. In the first 
case, this happened about a year after the market restriction, in the second case, a few 
months after the market closed. Can one link network change to market change? The 
first market change was followed by more frequent contacts within the network, and 
the network itself changed substantially later. The next market change led to less 
activity in the network, and some functions were removed from the network. However, 
it is difficult to link the network changes directly to market changes. There is little 
substance in these links: at best, market changes may have contributed to network 
change, but the network change itself came slowly, especially in the first case. 
But there were other sources of change. The replacement of the Ministry of Trade 
with MERT in mid-2000 seemed to contribute towards the increased activity in the 
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network, and better access for some business actors to state agencies. When MERT 
took over responsibility for export management, the activity level in the network rose. 
Business actors were allowed to, and wanted to participate more, and this meant that 
the network between state and business actors acquired more functions. It was a two-
way process: the business side also seemed to take the initiative more often.  
An important reason for the network change in mid-2002 could be the designation 
of Russia as a market economy by the US presidential administration. When Russia 
was designated a market economy, some of the problems previously managed within 
the network were moved to arenas outside the network. Accordingly, the network lost 
some of its previously acquired functions.  
Sector structure 
At the end of this chapter, I discuss the network as influenced by the independent 
variables. Did changes to the sector structure influence the network to change? As will 
be remembered from pages 6 and 29, sector structure is a combination of the economic 
structure of the industry and the economic weight of the industry. Did changes here 
influence the steel network to change? In general, it does not seem so. There were no 
significant changes in the steel industry, or in its economic weight, that preceded the 
network changes in 2000. This change seemed, as discussed above, to be more 
influenced by the government agency change from Ministry of Trade to MERT. 
Likewise, the change in 2002 was more influenced by the designation of Russia as a 
market economy by the US government, and will therefore be discussed below. But 
another change, the inclusion of a fourth steel producer (EvrazHolding) in mid-2001, 
could be seen as a consequence of sector change. One argument here is that the three 
medium steel mills controlled by EvrazHolding were updated and modernised in the 
period, and EvrazHolding, which was consolidated only in 1999, became a more 
important player within the sector. And from this perspective, the inclusion of 
EvrazHolding was a consequence of sector change. On the other hand, the three large 
plants were continually modernised and updated in the period under study as well. 
However, I think that the inclusion of EvrazHolding still was a consequence of sector 
change. United under the relatively new management of EvrazHolding, the three 
medium steel mills achieved a new significance in the sector, and an economic weight 
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they had not had before. It became impossible to overlook them in decisions and 
negotiations about steel export, and in turn, the network included a new member. 
However, this did not affect any of the other dimensions of the network. The network 
retained its functions and structure. Accordingly, this change in sector structure did not 
affect the network in general. 
Bilateral relations 
Did bilateral relations influence the network to change? Bilateral relations are 
defined as official contacts between Russian and American government agencies; 
bilateral agreements, and Russian and American government acts and statements 
directly targeting the cases in the bilateral relationship. In the steel case, there were 
two prominent changes to the bilateral relations between Russia and the United States: 
the 1999 steel agreements, and the 2002 designation of Russia as a market economy. 
The 1999 steel agreements caused the market change discussed above, and it is 
concluded that the link to network change is tenuous. It cannot be ruled out as a 
contributing factor, however. The American designation of Russia as a market 
economy in 2002, on the other hand, had an immediate and clear impact on the state-
business network. In this case, it seems that the bilateral relations mattered when the 
network changed: that is what the actors said, and they acted according to their new 
possibilities at the very first opportunity. 
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4  The poultry case: history and analysis 
4.1  Introduction 
The main events in this case are the import ban on poultry meat from the United 
States, imposed by Russian veterinary authorities in March 2002, and the founding of 
a business association, the Association of Operators on the Eurasian Poultry Meat 
Market, in the summer of 2002. The case is centred on the mutual relations between 
the poultry industry and the state. The poultry industry is composed of poultry 
producers, importers, and their business associations. The state is also composed of 
multiple actors, and specifications are given along the way.  
This chapter divides into three parts. The first few pages give background 
information about the poultry market in Russia, and American import to it. Next 
comes a historical narrative that traces the developments in the case in detail from late 
2001 to late 2002. The third part is an analysis of the case as a case of state-business 
network formation and change.  
4.2  The background 
4.2.1  The Russian poultry market 
During the 1990s, pork and beef gave way to poultry as the Russian everyday meat, 
however, the total share of meat in the diet decreased as real incomes fell.32 Poultry 
became more important because of the low price of poultry meat, but import also 
played a part in changing food habits. Imported meat covered a greater share of 
Russian demand for poultry than for beef and pork (IEPP/APR 2002: 12, using 
background data from the Russian Ministry of Agriculture). Most imported poultry 
meat was less expensive than Russian meat.  
The Russian poultry market consisted of two main segments in the period under 
study.33 One segment consisted of poorer consumers, and one segment consisted of 
                                                 
32 Official meat consumption in Russia fell from 75 kilograms per person per annum in 1990, to 47 kilograms 
per person per annum in 2001. In 2002, it increased to 49 kilograms (MSKh and Rosptitsesoiuz 2003: 7). 
33 In addition, some consumers produced their own chickens for own consumption and for sale. This had the 
effect of lowering sales of industrially produced poultry meat, imported and Russian, in rural regions of central 
and southern European Russia, and in Siberia.  
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richer consumers. Import played a more substantial part in the first segment than in the 
other. Russian producers offered mainly whole chickens and broilers. Imported 
chicken was mostly chicken parts, and one prominent product here was frozen 
American chicken quarters (whole legs). These were available by weight in retail and 
wholesale (IEPP/APR 2002: 6-7). They could be bought in small quantities at a time, 
and they were convenient for working people, being quick to fry. And crucially, these 
so-called Bush’s legs were less expensive than Russian whole chickens. Therefore, 
cheaper, imported cuts were often consumed by the working poor, the less wealthy 
parts of the population living in cities and towns, and by pensioners. This was more 
than half of Russia’s population. Wealthy parts of the population in major city centres 
bought more Russian broilers, either frozen or chilled, or chilled Russian chicken parts 
(IEPP/APR 2002: 42; IKAR 2002: 28-29, 55).  
4.2.2  American poultry in Russia 
During the 1990s, Russia became one of the largest export markets for American 
chicken. Bush’s legs first arrived in 1991 as food aid, and afterwards sold well on the 
Russian market.34 They soon occupied a well-defined niche in consumer demand. In 
Russia, American poultry producers could sell cuts that are less popular on the 
American market.35 Export is a relatively new feature of the American poultry 
business, as it became important only in the 1990s.  
Before the August 1998 crisis in the Russian economy, Russia’s share of US export 
of chicken legs was close to 40 per cent (Lyle 1998), and perhaps even higher.36 In 
2001, imports covered around two thirds of the Russian poultry market. American 
producers supplied 73 per cent of all import (Johnson 2001; IKAR 2002: 30). 
Estimates for the overall market share of American chicken legs range from 36 per 
cent of Russian poultry consumption in 2000, to around 45 per cent of Russian poultry 
consumption in 2001 (IEPP/APR 2002: 13, using background data from the Russian 
State Customs Committee; IKAR 2002: 28).  
                                                 
34 Bush’s legs were named after President George Bush. 
35 American consumers prefer white meats to dark, and prices for dark meat are low. In the Russian market, 
darker poultry cuts are preferred, as they have more taste. 
36 Illegal import was a persistent problem in the Russian poultry market, especially from 1996 to 1999. Import 
tariffs were at times very high; and they were routinely dodged. See Appendix, Figure A3. 
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4.2.3  Russian poultry production 
From 1992 to 1996, domestic Russian poultry production declined by almost 55 per 
cent, more than beef and pork production (Lyle 1997). Poultry production was spread 
across many Russian regions, and there were many small poultry enterprises. The 
poultry sector until around 2000 attracted little investment or political interest. Poultry 
production then turned into the most concentrated sector in the agricultural industry 
(IEPP/APR 2002: 10). It started to return profits. The size of operations was “enough 
to justify management expenses”, making it a welcome investment target (Ernst & 
Young CIS 2003a: 5). However, Russian poultry meat remained more expensive than 
imported meat. Production methods and energy use were not as efficient as in the 
West. Post-production phases, including refrigeration and freezing, transportation and 
retail networks, were inefficient. Poultry producers also received near to no subsidies. 
This was not always the case with meat imported from other countries.  
4.2.4  Food import and poultry trade 
Food import to Russia was legalised in 1992. Russia quickly became a dumping 
ground for many foodstuffs, because of lacking food import regulations, and too little 
control where regulations existed. Russian authorities quickly introduced import duties 
on food. In the case of poultry, these were at 20 per cent, growing to 25 per cent in 
1995. The duties were raised in 1995 to protect domestic production (Sigel 1995). In 
1996, duties on poultry rose again to 30 per cent. 
International poultry trade flows have increasingly been affected by hygienic and 
health considerations as well as trade regulations (Ablayeva 2001: 22-23). Trade in 
poultry has become highly restricted due to concerns over avian diseases. Sanitary 
procedures have varied, further restricting trade. This was a source of dispute between 
Russia and the United States in 1996 and in 2002.37 The degree of disruption such 
sanitary trade barriers can cause to the international poultry market was demonstrated 
for the first time when Russian officials stopped to issue import licences for American 
chicken in early 1996. When American businessmen, poultry producers and politicians 
protested, the government reacted quickly (Lyle 1996). Prime Minister Viktor 
                                                 
37 And not only in Russia: The European Union banned import of American poultry in 1998, because of 
excessive use of antibiotics in production. 
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Chernomyrdin declared that poultry imports should be allowed, and problems would 
be solved with consultations. A ban was actually put into force, in what to the 
Americans appeared to be a breach of promise. This inconsistency appears to have 
been a coordination problem, of which the Veterinary Service may have taken 
advantage. In the event, the ban was short-lived, and the Americans afterwards 
allowed joint spot inspections of American plants that delivered to the Russian market.  
In 2002, international poultry flows were more seriously affected during the 
Russian import ban for poultry meat from the United States. An important part of the 
background here are the vastly different standards that characterise poultry production 
in different countries. They make it difficult to know whether decisions are taken on 
grounds of health considerations or for political reasons. Multinational companies 
develop production technologies, like medication and feed, continuously. Authorities, 
on the other hand, respond with varying urgency in different countries, and in various 
ways. Therefore, a drug or treatment that is legal and widely used in one country can 
be illegal, outdated, or not arrived yet, in another. When disputes arise over such 
questions, bilateral negotiations are often the only way to solve them. 
4.3  US poultry comes under attack 
4.3.1  A newly active industry 
The Meat Union, a business association for meat producers, was established in 
1998. All the large Russian meat producers and importers quickly joined the union. It 
criticised imports for the first time shortly after its foundation, but refrained from 
criticism of American meat imports at this point (Helmer 1998). There was in fact 
ample reason to look into poultry imports, with widespread illegal imports through 
bordering countries.  
In the autumn of 2001, particularly in December, there were calls across the 
industry to reduce poultry imports to Russia (Davleev 2003 [interview]). The Ministry 
of Agriculture in January 2002 investigated the opportunities for restricting food and 
agricultural imports, especially meat and poultry, through quotas imposed by the 
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Duma. Duma deputies were not against, but they wanted to treat all agricultural 
imports in one act, and not to restrict meat imports first, and the rest later (Sas 2002d).  
In February 2002, complaints about the rising imports, and falling prices on 
imported chicken, were the topic of a meeting in Rosptitsesoiuz, the poultry producers’ 
union (Kostina 2002a). The volumes of imported poultry had risen sharply during the 
Russian import ban on beef from the European Union in the first half of 2001. 
However, when the ban was lifted, poultry import remained high, and prices low. 
Various Russian producers now complained that they could not compete with the 
imported chicken. The first deputy minister for agriculture, Sergei Dankvert, who 
attended the meeting, agreed with the president of Rosptitsesoiuz, Nikolai Averianov, 
that import quotas would be a good solution to this situation. Musheg Mamikonian, the 
president of the Meat Union, would rather have quotas for all meat products (Kostina 
2002a). This position coincided with MERT’s (Kostina 2002b).  
4.3.2  Restrictions on American poultry in Ukraine 
In late 2001, USAPEEC in Moscow increased its activity in Ukraine and Belarus, 
after the positive experience on the Russian market (Krest’ianskie Vedomosti 2001). 
The Ukrainian government restricted import of American poultry for sanitary and 
health reasons from 1 January 2002, using the EU’s import ban on American poultry 
as an example.38 At the same time, the Chinese government banned American poultry 
(Krest’ianskie Vedomosti 2002a). 
4.3.3  Russian veterinary authorities ask for clarifications  
The Ukrainian restrictions became known to the Russian public a few weeks into 
2002. An article in a Moscow newspaper prompted the Ministry of Agriculture to issue 
a press release, in which it emphasised that its Veterinary Department carried out 
annual sanitary controls of American producers exporting to Russia, applying its own 
sanitary regulations, unlike the Ukrainian authorities (Isakova 2002). The leader of the 
Veterinary Department, Mikhail Kravchuk, also Russia’s chief veterinarian, had 
                                                 
38 During 2001, American food safety authorities amended policies and procedures for antibiotics residue in 
poultry and meat (Food Safety and Inspection Service 2001). This followed reports about antibiotics resistance 
in bacteria harmful to humans, due to the application of a type of antibiotic in poultry production (Bren 2001).  
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signed the press release. The press release announced that the Veterinary Department 
had already asked the Americans for clarification on stimulating agents, preservatives, 
and disinfectants applied in poultry production and treatment. Kravchuk emphasised 
that there were no grounds for the Russian press reports about an alleged impending 
Russian import ban (Kravchuk 2002a). The same day, Interfaks reported that Sergei 
Dankvert could not rule out the possibility of a Russian import ban on US poultry 
(Dobrov 2002a). The minister for agriculture, Aleksei Gordeev, a day later denied that 
import would be banned (AK&M 2002a). 
The US authorities replied to the Veterinary Department’s questions on 5 February, 
with a lengthy document of 300 pages. On 11 February, the Veterinary Department 
required more specific answers to 14 more questions, with deadline on 1 March. The 
answers were delivered on 28 February, and requests for further clarifications were 
immediately issued by the Veterinary Department. Dankvert announced that Russia 
could ban American poultry import “at any moment” (Interfaks 2002a).  
4.4  The import ban 
On 1 March, the Veterinary Department announced that import licences for 
American poultry were invalid after 10 March, and no new licences would be issued 
from 1 March. Mikhail Kravchuk had signed the order on 28 February, before the 
deadline expired (Kravchuk 2002b; Dobrov 2002b). Quite unlike the press release 
from January, the order referred to numerous instances of non-compliance by 
American exporters with Russian veterinary authorities’ demands. The announcement 
included a list of non-compliances. During the morning of 1 March, Aleksei Gordeev 
refuted that import would be banned, and only later in the day did he acknowledge that 
a ban had already been issued. It would only be possible to reconsider the ban after 10 
March, if official American guarantees for the safety of the products were received. 
4.4.1  American reactions 
American authorities and USAPEEC quickly announced that the American side had 
complied with the demands from the Veterinary Department in time, and that the 
import ban was groundless (United States Trade Representative 2002). The American 
ambassador to Moscow, Alexander Vershbow, during the first days after 1 March 
 77 
 
discussed the issue with both German Gref and Andrei Illarionov, President Putin’s 
advisor. The ambassador’s request to discuss the ban with representatives of the 
Ministry of Agriculture was rejected (Voronina, Simakov and Kuznetsova 2002). The 
Ministry of Agriculture also, on 6 March, rejected a proposal from Vershbow to 
discuss the issue with American experts before 10 March (Kommersant 2002; Dobrov 
2002c).  
4.4.2  Bilateral negotiations coincide with salmonella findings 
Only one day later, representatives of the Veterinary Department and the American 
Embassy discussed a list of American experts that would come to Moscow (Interfaks 
2002b). Negotiations started in Moscow on 11 March. That day, Dankvert announced 
that because of the many different aspects of the ban, the negotiations would take time 
(Interfaks 2002d). Dankvert also referred to recent salmonella findings, which would 
be an issue in the negotiations. On 5 March, the Ministry of Agriculture had disclosed 
that during the last few days several parties of American poultry were found to contain 
salmonella bacteria (Evstigneeva 2002a). The number of infected parties grew during 
the following week. Salmonella, not uncommon in Russian and American poultry, 
took on a political meaning. Reports about the low quality of the American chicken 
soon abounded in the media. Alarmist statements came from Duma politicians, Health 
Minister Iurii Shevchenko, and journalists alike (Evstigneeva 2002b).  
At the eve of the negotiations, Ambassador Vershbow expressed that the American 
side no longer saw a connection between the issues of steel and poultry (Arsiukhin 
2002). The negotiations took place in expert groups for import certification, 
salmonella, antibiotics and hormones. They were difficult, and the American experts 
postponed their departure to Kyiv, where they were to negotiate with Ukrainian 
authorities on their import restrictions. 
On 20 March, Aleksei Gordeev finally met with the American ambassador. This 
underlined positive developments in the negotiations. A central issue in their 
discussions was the responsibility of American veterinarians. As soon as the Russian 
side recognised them as authorised to issue Russian veterinary certificates, import 
could resume. A few other questions pertaining to the certificates also remained. The 
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Russian government in addition wanted to ban import of chicken from producers in 
whose deliveries salmonella had been found, and to inspect them with joint veterinary 
commissions before allowing export to Russia (Sagdiev 2002a).  
The joint negotiation protocol was signed on 31 March. Import should resume from 
10 April, with temporary certificates, and on the condition that Russian veterinarians 
carry out inspections in the United States before this date. Inspections were duly 
carried out. While in the US, some of the Russian veterinarians announced that they 
were against lifting the ban. Temporary certificates were in fact not issued before 15 
April, coinciding with German Gref’s visit to Washington. 
4.4.3  A ban for political reasons? 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Russian and American media did not 
hesitate to link the import ban with the American safeguard measures on steel 
introduced on 5 March. There were puzzles in the behaviour of the Russian veterinary 
authorities: the change of line during February, conflicting announcements from 
different officials in the Ministry of Agriculture, and the issue of whether the 
Americans had complied with Russian demands or not.39 Why had the Russian 
authorities been so slow to ask questions? The Ukrainian authorities banned import of 
American poultry already in January. American residue regulations had been under 
review from early in the preceding autumn. The reports in 2000 about antibiotics 
resistance in the United States had been followed by appropriate attention by the 
American authorities. Surely, the Russian authorities must have known of these 
issues? If the problem was in hygienic standards, quality and certification, it was 
relevant to question the timing. To many observers, it seemed that the ban was 
imposed for political reasons.  
4.4.4  The import ban and the domestic poultry business 
From the Russian poultry business’s point of view, the import ban could turn out to 
have positive consequences. It was an opportunity to increase prices, because a 
substantial part of cheap imports would disappear from the market. Many poultry 
producers claimed that current prices did not even cover costs. This could give them a 
                                                 
39 To add to the confusion, the chief veterinarian, Mikhail Kravchuk, was on sick leave from 1 March. 
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respite from the competition offered by Bush’s legs and other American poultry 
products. In the longer term, it could serve as a boost to investment in the business, as 
wider profit margins could lead to increased investment. This coincided with the 
government’s strategy of increasing domestic production of most foodstuffs, especially 
poultry. Self-sufficiency in food had a high priority in the Russian government. The 
motive for proposing poultry import quotas had been to stimulate domestic production. 
It seemed unlikely that quotas could be introduced during 2002, but the effect of the 
import ban could be quite similar to that of import quotas.  
Therefore, when the ban was introduced, the media focus was more on the domestic 
poultry business than on the sanitary aspect of the case. Russian authorities, from the 
Veterinary Department to cabinet ministers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID), 
and the prime minister, were quick to refer to the sanitary control grounds for the 
import ban (Voronina, Simakov and Kuznetsova 2002). The grounds were not well 
specified. Different reasons appeared in comments made by different people. Ministry 
of Agriculture officials also underlined the difficult situation in the Russian poultry 
business. The sanitary aspect of the case, always included in comments on the ban, 
remained hazy. This could be because such issues are rather complicated. 
Nevertheless, it reinforced the impression of a ban for political, not sanitary reasons. 
Meanwhile, the situation in the Russian poultry business received unprecedented in-
depth coverage and attention in central and regional media outlets. 
4.4.5  Poultry importers and the import ban 
One part of the poultry business received little attention. The large import 
companies stood to gain from the import ban, especially if it did not last too long. 
Large import companies can have quite large stocks, sufficient for several weeks’ 
business, waiting in warehouses to be sold to wholesalers. The stocks in early 2002 
were three times higher than at the same time in 2001 (Interfaks 2002e). A short-lived 
import ban would allow importers to empty warehouses at high prices, perhaps high 
enough to cover the slump in business that would follow as imports ceased. Small 
importers, on the other hand, were likely to carry considerable losses during a ban, no 
matter how short-lived. Many of them would probably go bankrupt. 
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4.4.6  The motivations for the import ban 
There were, accordingly, motivations for the import ban apart from the sanitary 
ones. One source suggests that the ban was imposed for economic or market reasons, 
to let the market recover its balance after American imports increased (Tiurina 2003 
[interview]). This is supported by another source inside the import business, who 
mentions the consideration of supporting domestic producers as a motivating factor for 
the import ban (Andrianov 2003 [letter]). Considering the emphasis state officials put 
on market factors over sanitary factors, this seems a likely explanation for the ban.  
4.4.7  Effects of the import ban 
Some observers predicted that prices would rise substantially when the import ban 
was introduced in March. In fact, wholesale prices for whole chickens rose only by 10 
per cent during the import ban. The wholesale price for chicken quarters increased on 
average by 12 per cent (IAM 2002). Imported chicken quarters were still nearly 20 per 
cent cheaper than whole chickens. Imported chicken’s share of the market also grew a 
little compared with 2001 (Interfaks 2002e; Sagdiev 2002b; Krest’ianskie Vedomosti 
2003). American chicken lost around 10 percentage points of its market share to 
imports from Brazil and the European Union, mainly France and Germany (IAM 
2002; Tiurina 2003 [interview]).  
The import ban affected smaller American suppliers and Russian importers more 
than larger ones, because the small operators had less financial strength when faced 
with sudden market changes. While this is beyond doubt, speculations that the import 
ban was lobbied through by the large importers, in an effort to get rid of the smaller 
one, cannot be substantiated here (see Prianishnikov 2002). 
4.4.8  The political significance of the import ban 
The political significance of the import ban increased as Russian politicians and 
bureaucrats repeatedly emphasised the technical, non-political reasons for the ban, 
while at the same time often underlining the low quality of American chicken. 
Therefore, the ban had already acquired political overtones before foreign minister 
Igor Ivanov discussed it on telephone with Secretary of State Colin Powell on 8 March 
(Interfaks 2002c). Throughout the crisis, even the two presidents would discuss the 
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import ban on telephone more than once (Krest’ianskie Vedomosti 2002b). As Sergei 
Dankvert and Ministry of Agriculture spokesmen eagerly pointed out, such import 
bans were introduced regularly; in fact, a ban had been introduced on Chinese beef and 
pork from 15 March (RBK 2002a). Still, the ban on American poultry was the only 
one that attracted political attention, for example when the Duma voted in support of 
the Russian government’s position (RIA Novosti 2002). The Duma also asked the 
government to develop a programme for the Russian poultry business.  
4.5  Poultry import from the US after the chicken crisis 
4.5.1  Prolonged insecurity 
Insecurity about American poultry import to Russia continued until September. This 
was especially the case in Moscow, where Mayor Iurii Luzhkov banned central 
purchases of American poultry in May. Otherwise, the problems were the unclear 
status of the temporary veterinary certificate, and chicken that had left the United 
States under the old certificate. There were also delays in customs declarations due to 
queues that had formed in ports during the period of the import ban.  
Another problem was that the temporary certificate was valid only through June; 
while negotiations about a new one could not reach a conclusion in June. This meant 
that all parties of American poultry could be stopped in customs yet again from 1 July, 
and again from 1 August. The negotiations continued in July, as the two sides blamed 
each other for delaying the process. High-level contact accompanied the negotiations. 
There were several telephone conversations between the Deputy Ministers Sergei 
Dankvert and John B. Penn (Sagdiev and Evstigneeva 2002; Interfaks 2002g).  
4.5.2  New certificates 
At the end of July, Russian authorities prolonged the temporary certificate’s validity 
period with six weeks. There were further delays in the negotiations in early August, 
but by the third week of August, the new certificate was finally agreed upon. Russian 
veterinary inspections of American plants could start in late October. As it were, this 
put an end to the chicken crisis proper.  
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The Americans entered into several compromises with the Russians. They agreed to 
Russian standards for the use of antibiotics; chlorine concentration in washing water 
for carcasses; use-by dates of frozen processed meat for industrial use, and actions to 
avoid chicken flu (Karpova 2002). 
4.6  2003: Meat import quotas 
Meat quotas were introduced in April 2003. The poultry business, politicians and 
the Ministry of Agriculture had worked towards this for more than a year. The poultry 
quotas, in 2003 set at the approximate level of import in 2002, were due to decrease 
from 2006 (Pravitel’stvo RF 2003). The historic principle was used to decide the share 
of the quota allotted to each country, as well as the quota size for each importer.40 The 
importers’ shares were distributed by the importers’ own business association, the 
Association of Eurasian Poultry Market Operators, of which more below. Following 
the introduction of meat quotas, prices for all sorts of meat rose during the summer and 
autumn of 2003. 
4.7  A new start for the poultry business? 
4.7.1  Passivity and disunity 
Representatives of the poultry business were not involved in the negotiations with 
the Americans, and did not hold meetings with Russian government officials during 
March. In April, however, Aleksei Gordeev and other representatives of the Ministry 
of Agriculture held a meeting with the leaders in the business. They discussed a wide 
range of topics: the financial situation in the poultry business; perspectives for 
development; changes to the tax system; and the importance of changing import tariff 
policy (Interfaks 2002f). The chicken crisis had clearly created a need to discuss the 
situation and future of the business in general.  
Industry leaders present at this meeting accused USAPEEC of preparing a slander 
campaign against Russian veterinary authorities, and of spreading incorrect 
information about the Russian veterinary service (Interfaks 2002f). This was not long 
after USAPEEC had been excluded from Rosptitsesoiuz, the poultry business 
                                                 
40 With the historic principle, current share of import is based on historic data for previous share. 
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association (Sagdiev 2002d). The poultry business leaders and USAPEEC did not get 
along well in this period, and there was a general lack of communication between 
them (Surikov 2003 [interview]).  
4.7.2  The first deputy minister complains of lacking support 
State-business relations were also in need of improved communication, according to 
First Deputy Minister Sergei Dankvert. In early September, he participated at a 
presentation in the Russian Cattle-Breeding Union. In his speech, he lamented the 
general state of “lobbyism” in the agricultural sector. In his opinion, there was too 
little of it. He described the Union of Russian Sugar Producers as the only effective 
and supportive business association in the agrarian lobby. “When the sugar producers 
need the government to make a decision, they themselves prepare all the calculations, 
and the Ministry of Agriculture’s representative at the session of the Commission for 
Protective Measures [in Foreign Trade] only has to ‘add a couple of words to the 
document’ for the necessary resolution to be made” (Sagdiev 2002e).  
Dankvert specifically complained about having to “fight the ‘trade war’ on the 
American chicken quarters on his own”. He said that “poor and impotent” business 
associations were not what the Ministry of Agriculture needed. Rosptitsesoiuz had not 
supported the Ministry of Agriculture’s import ban openly or financed “the fight 
[against American chicken quarters]”. He admitted that a couple of companies had 
advertised on television in support of domestic poultry production (Sagdiev 2002e). 
This public reproach of the main business association was received as a confirmation 
of earlier rumours that Rosptitsesoiuz was not particularly close to, or favoured by, the 
government in this period (Rybak and Sagdiev 2002). 
He concluded the argument with a call for business associations to take the initiative 
towards the government, and to support the Ministry of Agriculture’s initiatives within 
the government and in the State Duma. He especially mentioned the amendments to 
the foreign trade law that would allow quotas for foodstuffs. While the Ministry of 
Agriculture worked towards extensive quotas for all meat and most dairy produce, this 
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failed to attract support in the State Customs Committee or MERT.41 Therefore, the 
Ministry of Agriculture had only one instrument in foreign economic affairs: the 
veterinary regulations (Sagdiev 2002e).  
Here, in contrast to the steel case, a member of the government complained about a 
lack of support from the business in question. According to the quoted report, industry 
representatives understood Dankvert’s laments. 
4.7.3  A new business association 
In the poultry business, so-called lobbyists had already taken the initiative that 
Dankvert asked for. The Association of Eurasian Poultry Market Operators42 
(Association of Operators) was founded on 4 July 2002 (Surikov 2003 [interview]) by 
the main poultry importers on the Russian market: Evroservis, OptiFud, and 
Soiuzkontrakt. The association was founded with the explicit aim of becoming the 
government’s main partner on the Russian poultry market, and the government 
actively supported it (Surikov 2003 [interview]). The Ministry of Agriculture’s press 
service first announced that the Association of Operators had been created (Rybak and 
Sagdiev 2002). Agricultural Minister Gordeev presided at the association’s first press 
conference and formal opening in August (Igumnova 2002; USAPEEC 2002; Surikov 
2003 [interview]). In his statements, he emphasised that the association should become 
the government’s main advisor on questions of poultry import, as well as have a 
“decisive influence on the distribution of import quotas for poultry planned for 2003” 
(Prianishnikov 2002).  
The president of the Association of Operators, Iurii Masliukov, was a well-known 
politician and a former deputy prime minister under Evgenii Primakov, who was now 
the head of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Masliukov also had ties to the 
defence industry. His deputies, Albert Ageev and Anton Surikov, were former deputy 
head of the government staff and former Duma Defence Committee head of staff, 
respectively (Igumnova 2002). The high-ranking profiles from outside the industry 
                                                 
41 It was believed that extensive quotas would lead to a general rise in food prices and illegal imports of dairy 
produce as well as meat. 
42 According to one source, the use of ‘Eurasian’, not ‘Russian’, in the Association’s name, was a concession 
insisted on by the Ministry of Agriculture (Levicheva 2002). Iurii Masliukov referred to the Eurasian Customs 
Union (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) as a reason not to use ‘Russian’ (USAPEEC 2002).  
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that were to lead the Association of Operators strengthened the association’s political 
profile.43 It also strengthened the impression that the association was intended as a 
force for change in the poultry market. 
Together, the association’s founding companies represented at least a 75 per cent 
share of the Russian market.44 By May 2003, it had more than 50 members (Surikov 
2003 [interview]). The association was seen as a bid by the major importers to acquire 
greater control of the import market, and to weaken competition from smaller 
importers (Igumnova 2002; Prianishnikov 2002). Masliukov’s statements at the 
August press conference indicated that this was the case. He emphasised that it was 
difficult for state agencies to cope with the thousands of actors in the market, all of 
different sizes, and this had led the market into a bad state of affairs. One way to avoid 
this in the future was to let the Association of Operators grow into a self-regulating 
organisation, complete with its own trademark, and with close ties to the state 
(Masliukov 2002). He underlined that this way forward would give the market greater 
stability, while the alternative was to let things float as they were, with the market 
under a lack of state control (USAPEEC 2002).  
It seems likely that a consequence of such self-regulation could be less competition. 
One of the goals of self-regulation was to fight against continued illegal and semi-legal 
imports, by Masliukov estimated at 15-20 per cent of the market (USAPEEC 2002). 
But small importers also appeared to be a target, judging by the emphasis Masliukov 
placed on regulation of size and standard. In a longer perspective, he envisaged a 
“union of associations”, which were to regulate the market. These associations should 
comprise all producers, wholesale buyers and operators: “[they]…cannot be outside 
the associations that regulate the market” (USAPEEC 2002). The Association of 
Operators intended to involve itself also in commercial projects, as an investor, 
possibly with foreign cooperation (Masliukov 2002; USAPEEC 2002). 
It seems that another important motive for establishing the Association of Operators 
was to ease introduction of import quotas for meat. This was confirmed in personal 
                                                 
43 Doubts surrounded the question of whether Iurii Masliukov really was an outsider. According to rumours, he 
was connected with OptiFud, and therefore, his appointment to president of the Association of Operators could 
be taken to reflect relative strengths within the business (Prianishnikov 2002). 
44 One source estimated 85 per cent (Smovzh 2002). 
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communication with a representative of one of the founders of the Association 
(Andrianov 2003 [letter]). The association established ties with MERT, the State 
Customs Committee and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry already in August 
2002 (Sagdiev 2002d). Throughout the autumn and winter of 2002, the association 
participated actively in the development of a quota system. The Association of 
Operators later allotted importers’ shares of quotas. One could speculate that this, too, 
could have motivated poultry business leaders to establish the association in the first 
place. Such implementation tasks are, as seen also in the steel case, not uncommon for 
business associations in Russia (cf. Lehmbruch 2001). Quotas for poultry are 
distributed on the basis of previous import volumes, a system that clearly favours the 
larger, established enterprises, like the founders of the association. 
The new occurrence in the poultry market after the import ban was its political 
significance. Apparently, if poultry importers were to have any political influence on 
their market, a business association was a means to secure it. The Association of 
Operators was not only a business association with support from the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The association also acquired influential lobbyists of its own, and most 
likely financial means to match. These means could, through a quota system, translate 
into even more influence on market conditions.  
4.7.4  Rosptitsesoiuz 
Rosptitsesoiuz remained the poultry producers’ interest organisation. It was closely 
connected with the Ministry of Agriculture by location and structurally: its offices are 
in the Ministry of Agriculture building, and the head of the Animal Husbandry and 
Breeding Department of the Ministry of Agriculture was a member of Rosptitsesoiuz’s 
Council of Directors.  
Rosptitsesoiuz’s leaders did not welcome the new Association of Operators. Upon 
the founding of the association, the president of Rosptitsesoiuz, Nikolai Averianov, 
stated that he was against separate associations for producers and importers, and would 
like to see the two united in the future (Sagdiev 2002d).  
Rosptitsesoiuz had been created in May 2001, and in 2002 had around 200 
members, of which about 180 were poultry producing enterprises (IKAR 2002). It 
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apparently lost influence with the Ministry of Agriculture in 2002. While in February, 
Dankvert attended a meeting in Rosptitsesoiuz, in September, he complained about the 
lack of support from it. In general, it was not perceived as close to state agencies in 
2002 (Rybak and Sagdiev 2002).  
4.7.5  Rosptitsesoiuz acts 
Rosptitsesoiuz approached the government’s Commission for Protective Measures 
in Foreign Trade in June 2002. At its request, the question of imported meat’s damage 
to domestic production was considered in July (Sagdiev 2002c; Andrianov 2003 
[letter]). The material on which Rosptitsesoiuz based this request largely concerned the 
rapid increase in poultry import from 1999. As shown in Table A3, official Russian 
statistics on this issue are likely to be incomplete, because the years 1996-1999 saw 
substantial illegal import. Therefore, Rosptitsesoiuz’s request was supported by 
questionable information. The commission nevertheless recommended that an 
additional protective duty at 8.3 per cent should be levied from date and throughout 
2002. This recommendation led to further investigation by MERT (RBK 2002b), in 
which Rosptitsesoiuz, USAPEEC, and the Association of Operators participated 
(Davleev 2003 [interview]). The additional protective duty was in the event dismissed 
in favour of the new quota system in November.  
4.7.6  A government programme 
The new input into relations between the industry and the government later also 
produced a result similar to that in the steel business: a programme for development of 
the industry. The president instructed the government to develop such a programme in 
early August 2002, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Rosptitsesoiuz and three research 
institutes worked out a draft programme in early 2003 (MSKh and Rosptitsesoiuz 
2003).45 Similar programmes followed in some regions, like Moscow oblast (RIA 
Novosti 2003).  
The draft programme for development of the poultry industry from 2003-2005 to 
2010 had the goal of increased self-sufficiency in the Russian poultry market. It set out 
                                                 
45 The participating research institutes were the All-Russian Institute for Scientific Technological Research of 
Poultry Production (VNITIP); the All-Russian Institute for Scientific Research of the Poultry Meat Processing 
Industry (VNIIPP); and the Inter-Regional Scientific-Technical Centre for Poultry Breeding.  
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measures for market protection, and detailed the means to increase self-sufficiency, 
through increased competitiveness of Russian poultry producers compared to foreign 
poultry imports. The programme outlined investment projects in several regions, 
where private investments, government grants and indirect contributions from the 
federal budget through research institutions were to secure the development of modern 
and competitive poultry farms. The draft programme to a great extent reflected the 
poultry business’s demands, both in its goals and the measures to reach them. This was 
particularly the case for the investment programmes. 
4.8  This case in light of the core question 
In this section, I first describe the network in the case according to the network 
dimensions. I then discuss how one may understand the case in light of the models 
outlined in the theoretical chapter. Lastly, I discuss network changes, and possible 
explanations for them. 
4.8.1  The network in this case 
Actors 
Who were the actors? There were several business actors, and some state actors. 
The most prominent state actor in this case was the Ministry of Agriculture. While the 
Veterinary Department was responsible for the import ban in March 2002, the driving 
force behind state-business relations on the state side was the Ministry’s political 
leadership, especially First Deputy Minister Sergei Dankvert. MERT was a less active 
agency in the question of poultry import than in steel export. Relations with the 
poultry business on the issue were coordinated and managed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture. As the ban was imposed under Russian veterinary regulations, 
coordination by other agencies was not an option.  
The relationship between the two government agencies at this time seems to have 
been neither close, nor good. After the end of 2002, that is, after the case ended, it 
seems that MERT and the Ministry of Agriculture had more frequent, and also more 
coordinated, contact. This was mostly connected with the new import quotas for meat. 
Both during the case and after it, MERT had separate contacts with the business on 
issues within its sphere of competence: quotas, import regime, and tariffs. For 
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example, USAPEEC had formalised meetings with MERT representatives twice 
annually (Davleev 2003 [interview]).  
Within the Ministry of Agriculture, information channels did at times appear to be 
rather weakly developed. This was particularly visible when the import ban was 
imposed. The issue quickly rose to the political level, with lower level bureaucrats 
taking care of the technical side of negotiations, and little more. 
MID was apparently not very well informed about what was going to happen in 
early March, and this improved only a little afterwards. This absence of participation 
on the part of MID is interesting. On one hand, it can be seen as a consequence of 
MID’s well known conservatism and disinterest in trade issues. On the other hand, 
poorly defined responsibilities in foreign policy can have played a part (cf. Shevtsova 
2003: 242). It may also have been caused by efforts to reduce the political significance 
of the ban. After all, the issue had acquired a disproportional enough presence in the 
Russian-American relationship, and MID’s involvement would hardly reduce it. 
Telephone conversations about the ban at minister level were perhaps unavoidable, but 
general MID involvement could worsen matters. Accordingly, I conclude that the 
Ministry of Agriculture was the main state actor in the poultry network, but that 
MERT also played a role on some issues. 
On the business side, Rosptitsesoiuz was quite active just before the import ban was 
introduced. It quickly lost significance towards the middle of 2002. Still, it was close 
to the Ministry of Agriculture throughout the period under study. As noted above, this 
is a geographical and structural closeness, but it could also be functional: When I 
contacted Rosptitsesoiuz and asked for an interview, I was eventually informed that I 
had to go through the Ministry of Agriculture, as the union was not authorised to give 
me information (Rosptitsesoiuz 2003 [telephone conversation]).  
Another important business actor was the Association of Operators of the Eurasian 
Poultry Market. This association represented poultry import businesses, mainly the 
three or four largest importers. It seemed to take over some of Rosptitsesoiuz’s 
functions as a channel of access between state and business actors. In addition, it took 
on more functions than Rosptitsesoiuz had previously had. 
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Were Rosptitsesoiuz and the Association of Operators representational monopolies? 
After all, access to the Ministry of Agriculture seemed to come through membership in 
Rosptitsesoiuz for poultry producers, or the Association of Operators for poultry 
importers (from mid-2002). A strong argument here is that the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s political leadership apparently preferred interaction with business 
associations, not with single businesses. To influence the poultry market, the major 
poultry importers needed access to the Ministry of Agriculture. They acquired it 
through the creation of the Association of Operators. Another strong argument for this 
view is that representational monopoly was an explicit motive for establishing the 
association. The association’s president, Iurii Masliukov, as well as the Minister for 
Agriculture, Aleksei Gordeev, repeated this at the association’s first press conference.  
This is not a perfect representational monopoly, however. USAPEEC, which 
represented American producers and exporters, throughout the period had direct access 
to MERT and the Ministry of Agriculture. When USAPEEC was excluded from 
Rosptitsesoiuz in early 2002, this did not seem to restrict its direct access to the 
Ministry of Agriculture significantly. However, it could have affected its indirect 
access. When asked about his contacts, the USAPEEC representative in Moscow 
emphasised that he maintained contacts with all business associations, not only 
because they were important to the business, but because they were channels of access 
to the Ministry of Agriculture (Davleev 2003 [interview]). 
Functions 
What did the actors do? Here, there was development during the case. There was 
relatively little activity on the part of Rosptitsesoiuz in the period leading up to the 
introduction of the import ban in March 2002. Rosptitsesoiuz held meetings, like the 
one in February 2002, where representatives of both the Ministry of Agriculture and 
MERT were present. However, it seems that the organisation mainly issued demands, 
and was consulted by the Ministry of Agriculture, while not participating in any kind 
of negotiation or cooperation. This could be because the parties directly affected by an 
import ban, namely, the importers, generally were not represented among its members. 
The exception was USAPEEC, which however faced considerable difficulties in 
having its opinion heard within Rosptitsesoiuz, and later was excluded.  
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No matter how this lack of communication is explained, it meant that relatively few 
functions were channelled through the network. As Rosptitsesoiuz and the Ministry of 
Agriculture were closely integrated, there was a potential for more functions to be 
carried out in cooperation. 
The confrontational stance of Rosptitsesoiuz during the build-up to the import ban 
may have caused the Ministry of Agriculture’s leadership to consider it an unsuitable 
channel for coordination and cooperation. This could explain why the Association of 
Operators was established as a channel of coordination, cooperation, and later 
implementation, between the Ministry of Agriculture and the poultry importers. 
According to one source, the Association of Operators was intended by the Ministry of 
Agriculture to balance Rosptitsesoiuz (Levicheva 2002). 
The Association of Operators was in continuous contact with the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and also MERT, on the issue of import quotas (Andrianov 2003 [letter]). 
According to a representative of the association, it had close contacts with both 
ministries in general, and also with the State Customs Committee, in the Duma and the 
Federation Council, and these contacts served to “bring our point of view to the 
attention of the government” (Surikov 2003 [interview]). The association took on 
extensive coordinating functions in developing a meat quota policy. The association 
took the initiative, and enlisted the support of other business associations, to establish 
a consultation council to monitor meat import (Andrianov 2003 [letter]). This 
consultation council was established in the autumn of 2002. It actively advised MERT 
during the development of quota regulations in late 2002 and early 2003. According to 
one of the association’s founders, also a co-chair of the new council, their proposals 
led MERT to change the proposed regulations (Andrianov 2003 [letter]). This was 
confirmed in the Association of Operators as well. The council was active and had 
quite an influence on the quota system (Surikov 2003 [interview]). That the council’s 
proposals met with understanding in government agencies should come as no surprise, 
as more than half of its members were representatives of the executive and legislative 
power (Surikov 2003 [interview]). It accordingly seems to have created a broader base 
for the new quota system. 
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To sum up, the Association of Operators was delegated public authority on the issue 
of poultry import to a considerable extent. Public authority on the issue of 
development of the poultry business in Russia in general was to a degree delegated to 
Rosptitsesoiuz. This contrasts with the one-way access Rosptitsesoiuz represented 
before March 2002, when it largely issued demands, and otherwise participated only to 
a limited extent. 
Structures 
How was the state-business network structured? On this dimension, there was less 
change. This was a rather closed structure. Membership was restricted. Initiative to a 
certain extent came from above, not from below, and this indicates that coordination 
was hierarchical. For one thing, the Minister of Agriculture explicitly approved the 
extensive delegation of public authority to the Association of Operators. Another thing 
is that access to the Ministry of Agriculture seemed to be very important for 
participants in the business, like the major importers and USAPEEC. There were also 
interlocking memberships and leaderships, with USAPEEC and the Association of 
Operators being members of each other’s organisations, and Rosptitsesiouz having 
Ministry of Agriculture representatives on its Council of Directors.  
Access was only partly ensured by multiple channels. For USAPEEC, there were 
multiple channels, as it had direct access, as well as the channel provided through 
membership in the Association of Operators. The same applied to OptiFud, the major 
importer, which was a member of both these organisations. But in general, the two 
main channels of access were the Association of Operators and Rosptitsesoiuz, and 
there were few cases of multiple memberships. There were also few direct links 
between members of these organisations and state actors. 
The network changed in the period under study. As the Association of Operators 
was included in the network, it became more intense and integrated. Contacts became 
more frequent and regular, over the issue of import quotas as well as a development 
programme for the business. After mid-2002, the network also took on more functions, 
as discussed above. This may have reinforced the tendency towards more interaction.  
 93 
 
However, I argue that this was a rather stable network. For example, the founding of 
the Association of Operators represented a strengthening of monopolisation of interest 
representation, rather than a threat to it. The Association of Operators was formed as 
an interest representation monopoly for poultry importers. This seemed to divide the 
poultry business into two nearly separate spheres, represented by the association and 
Rosptitsesoiuz, both with an approximation of representational monopoly. Before the 
association was founded, poultry importers were not represented through 
Rosptitsesoiuz or any other organisation. They still had interests in balancing 
Rosptitsesoiuz’s influence, and seemed to represent a challenge to it. However, the 
division of interest spheres between the two organisations, and the two branches of the 
business, was not perfect. For one thing, they still had partly conflicting interests. But 
the point here is that the possibilities of being represented through these business 
associations, as well as the difficulties of remaining outside them, were even more 
pronounced after the Association of Operators appeared than before.  
Another stable feature was the emphasis on hierarchy over horizontal consultation. 
Access to the Ministry of Agriculture was no less important towards the end of 2002 
than a year earlier. Consultation was still on a hierarchical basis, also when the 
Association of Operators was delegated the task of coordinating the development of 
the quota system with MERT.  
Institutionalisation 
To what extent was the network institutionalised and formalised? Institutions were 
important in this network. It was important for businesses to be represented in 
institutionalised and permanent channels, as discussed above. Actors from the state 
and the business side also seemed to prefer formal organisations and councils to 
informal meetings. Meetings between state and business actors often took place in 
formal settings, for example, meetings organised by business associations like 
Rosptitsesoiuz. These formal organisations wielded considerable influence, like the 
influence the Association of Operators had on the poultry market through its 
participation in the development of quota policy and implementation. 
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Power relations 
How autonomous was the state in this relationship? Did initiatives and decisions 
reflect one side of the relationship more than the other side? 
The power relations in the poultry network were to a large extent conditioned by the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s political leadership. This is an important finding in the case. 
The circumstances surrounding the creation of the Association of Operators support 
the finding. If the agricultural authorities actively sought to balance Rosptitsesoiuz, 
this indicates that they followed an instrumental strategy towards interest 
organisations. It also indicates that Rosptitsesoiuz was dependent on the Ministry of 
Agriculture for preserving its influence. Judging by Sergei Dankvert’s speech in 
September 2002, when he complained about a lack of support from Rosptitsesoiuz 
during the import ban, the Ministry of Agriculture’s political leadership may have 
drawn the conclusion that it needed a channel for communication with poultry 
importers, not only poultry producers. The Association of Operators fulfilled such a 
demand.  
In addition, no matter how one connects the Deputy Minister’s speech to the 
founding of the Association of Operators, the speech indicated an instrumental view of 
interest organisations: if they were “poor and incompetent”, they did not fulfil the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s needs (Sagdiev 2002e).  
But it remains unclear whether the initiative to establish the association came from 
the Ministry of Agriculture or from the large importers themselves. The large 
importers were not included in the process leading up to the import ban. This may 
have induced them to found the association as their own channel to the Ministry of 
Agriculture. However, once the Association of Operators was established it clearly 
satisfied the needs of both sides. The Ministry of Agriculture endorsed the Association 
from its founding day, and was clearly informed in advance about what was going to 
happen.  
It therefore seems that the state to a considerable extent influenced the business 
side’s access channels. The state was not only autonomous; it had a dominating 
presence in the network. Its instrumental view of access channels was shared by the 
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import businesses. The Association of Operators gave them direct access to the 
Ministry of Agriculture and MERT, in return for considerable influence on the poultry 
market, direct influence on the new import regulations, as well as control with the 
implementation of the regulations. The larger import businesses in this way acquired a 
means to control their market and competitors.  
Accordingly, while the Ministry of Agriculture influenced the channels of access to 
policymaking, the Association of Operators gave quite a few benefits in return to the 
large import businesses. One can argue that it was not as much a question of who had 
captured whom in the network, as of access channels that maximised benefits for both 
sides. Rosptitsesoiuz, initially perceived to lose influence when the association was 
created, was not left without benefits either: the draft development programme for the 
poultry business was strongly influenced by the organisation.  
Strategies of public administration 
Were the state agencies accessible to business actors? Did they actively support 
business associations? In this case, it seems that the Ministry of Agriculture pursued a 
strategy of being accessible only to some business associations: Rosptitsesoiuz and the 
Association of Operators, and partly to USAPEEC. Individual access, i.e., outside of 
these associations, seems to have been more difficult. The Ministry of Agriculture also 
actively supported and sponsored the Association of Operators, and partly 
Rosptitsesoiuz. The ministry delegated public authority to the Association of 
Operators relatively quickly after it was established. Much of this is discussed above. 
Three questions stand out as particularly important for this dimension. Firstly, did this 
represent an actively pursued strategy from the Ministry of Agriculture? Secondly, did 
the ministry prefer to support the Association of Operators instead of Rosptitsesoiuz? 
And thirdly, can the creation of the Association of Operators be seen as an attempt 
from the Ministry of Agriculture to destroy Rosptitsesoiuz? 
The Ministry of Agriculture favoured and supported the Association of Operators 
actively from the association’s establishment. The clearest indication is Agricultural 
Minister Aleksei Gordeev’s words at the founding press conference. He made it clear 
that the association was established as a partial representational monopoly. He would 
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hardly have said this without meaning it, and without some support also from his own 
ministry; after all, it maintained close ties with Rosptitsesoiuz.  
It also seems that the Association of Operators was intended to balance and 
complement, if not outright challenge Rosptitsesoiuz, from the side of the Ministry of 
Agriculture. Sergei Dankvert’s public complaints about the lack of support from 
Rosptitsesoiuz during the import ban, coupled with a reference to poor and 
incompetent business associations, indicate that this was the case. 
However, it is to take the argument too far to say that the creation of the Association 
of Operators was intended to destroy Rosptitsesoiuz. Rosptitsesoiuz might well lose 
influence, or be merged with the association later. But Rosptitsesoiuz’s participation in 
drafting a government programme for development in the poultry industry does not 
combine well with a strategy in the Ministry of Agriculture to destroy it.  
4.8.2  The network in poultry and the models 
How may one understand the network in light of the models from the theoretical 
chapter? Because the network had a limited number of actors, and rather closed 
boundaries, it is reasonable not to consider loose networking patterns. Loose 
networking patterns are characterised by many businesses and interest brokers, and an 
open membership on a case-by-case basis. I therefore concentrate on the three other 
approaches in the discussion of the poultry network. 
The poultry network at the end of this case was a closed, hierarchically coordinated, 
rather intense and dense network. It had many functions, indicating that state and 
business actors had an intense relationship. For example, the network channelled 
access, consultation, and cooperation in policy formation. Public authority was 
delegated for both policy development and implementation purposes. The network was 
highly institutionalised. It seems that the state was the stronger side in the relationship 
between state and business. As discussed above, this is not a clear-cut conclusion. For 
example, the business side received substantial gains, like significant influence on 
market conditions, in return for cooperation with state agencies. All in all, the poultry 
network cannot be characterised as a state capture network. Business interests did not 
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capture the state, and the state seemed to have rather more influence on business, and 
strategies towards business, than the other way around.  
If state capture and loose networking patterns are unlikely models for describing the 
poultry network, clans and elite exchange may be closer to the central characteristics 
of the case. Clans have one major interest group with an informal representational 
monopoly. They are dense, intense and stable, coordinated by horizontal consultation: 
membership is closed. The clan model allows for many different functions, 
characteristic of a highly integrated network. State autonomy is low. Now low state 
autonomy is not in accordance with the findings in this case. Neither is a network that 
is coordinated through horizontal consultation. And the access channels here seem to 
be more formal than informal. Therefore, to see the poultry network as a clan would be 
to ignore some of the findings here. But there are some similarities as well: the 
tendency towards representational monopoly and closed boundaries for membership, 
and the intense state-business relationship in the network.  
Elite exchange, on the other hand, is a model in which the network may be less 
intense, but it need not be so: it can include functions like negotiation and cooperation. 
The elite exchange structure is characterised by hierarchical authority, medium density 
and intensity. While boundaries for membership are open, membership is stable. And 
crucially here, power is equally distributed between state and business actors in elite 
exchange, with a strong emphasis on quid pro quo-relations. Is this the case in the 
poultry network? There is a possibility for that. After all, cooperation with state 
agencies in the poultry case brought valuable returns. On the other side, the state 
apparently took the initiative to change access channels: this seems a conscious 
strategy. Was the poultry network open to changes in membership? After all, the 
Association of Operators entered the network, so one could see membership as open 
and very stable, rather than close and occasionally modified. I argue that there was an 
imperfect representational monopoly in the poultry case. Representational monopoly is 
closely related to closed boundaries for membership. Therefore, it seems to take the 
findings in the poultry case too far to see it as elite exchange. On the other hand, the 
notion of an exchange could be an interesting idea for further studies. In this case, 
there was an exchange in which state actors gained influence on the access channels of 
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business towards themselves: how many there should be and which shape they could 
take. Business actors, on their side, gained influence on state policy and policy 
implementation in their market. In addition to a constant communication channel, this 
was the kind of representational monopoly that can lead to monopolisation or 
cartelisation in the market.  
The idea of an exchange between state and business actors is a useful way of 
approaching state-business interaction in this case. However, some of the findings 
point towards other ways of seeing state-business relationships in Russia. For example, 
the imperfect monopoly on interest representation, the active support for the 
Association of Operators by the Ministry of Agriculture, and the instrumental view of 
interest representation in this agency, point towards a more active state than was the 
case in Russia only a few years ago. It could be that other models of state-business 
interaction, for example, models that include sectoral corporatism, could be found 
useful on closer investigation.  
Corporatism is more formal than clientelism, of which clans is a variety, and often 
connected with an active state. Scholars do not agree on one definition of corporatism. 
Still, it is clear that in corporatism, be it within a sector, or at an overall societal level, 
“interest organizations become involved in policy implementation and acquire some 
form of public authority in order to aid them in this task” (van Waarden 1992: 47). 
This is, in van Waarden’s view, corporatism’s major point of departure from pluralism 
or clientelism. In corporatism, state agents support business interests through 
privileges, for example privileged access, and resources. In sectoral corporatism, this 
takes place at the sector level: access is privileged through sector-specific 
organisations or associations. Van Waarden also argues that in sectoral corporatism, 
assistance in policy implementation increases the mutual dependencies in the network 
and leads to more symmetrical relations than in clientelism and pluralism. And as 
regards network characteristics, sectoral corporatism is recognised by its high 
“stability and institutionalisation of relations, (…) centrality, presence of intermediary 
organisations, search for consensus and depoliticization” (1992: 47). In the poultry 
network, corporatism within a sector could accordingly provide a fruitful way of 
seeing state-business relationships.  
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4.8.3  A network in change? 
The major change in the poultry network was a pronounced development from mid-
2002 towards a more intense relationship. The inclusion of poultry importers into the 
network meant better representation. Essential features of the network, like a tendency 
towards imperfect monopolisation of interest representation, and hierarchical 
coordination of contacts, remained the same throughout the case.  
The point of departure for finding factors that influence the network is an 
organisational change. The founding of the Association of Operators represented an 
organisational change in the poultry industry. Poultry importers were until mid-2002 
denied representation, effectively blocked by Rosptitsesoiuz’s representational 
monopoly. The poultry importers founded a business association as an alternative to 
Rosptitsesoiuz, and this association was included in the network. Afterwards, 
interaction in the network became more intense. But the inclusion of poultry importers 
did not mean that the boundaries of the network became more open: on the contrary, 
once included in the network, poultry importers supported the same strategy of 
exclusive membership as poultry producers had been pursuing for some time.  
However, the import ban appeared to serve as a push for poultry importers and state 
actors alike to pursue this organisational change. It was the import ban that spurred the 
large importers to establish the Association of Operators (Surikov 2003 [interview]). 
The import ban put increased demands, and a higher workload, on the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s political leadership. Rosptitsesoiuz remained inactive and did not share 
the burden. This was later the point of Sergei Dankvert’s September speech. The main 
organisational change in the network, the inclusion of a new business association, can 
accordingly be seen as catalysed by the import ban.  
The lack of communication between state actors and a part of the poultry business, 
the importers, clearly was perceived as an acute problem by importers and state agents 
alike during the period of the import ban. But other considerations may also have 
played a part. The import ban showed the importers how exposed they were to 
changing regulations and interpretations of them. With the import ban, the Ministry of 
Agriculture abruptly changed the conditions in their market. If imports were to stop on 
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short notice every time the Ministry of Agriculture decided to pay attention to 
considerations of meat quality, a glut in the market, salmonella findings, or other 
problems, the risk in import to the Russian market would increase. It seems the large 
importers at some point during the import ban decided that it was far better to join this 
team than to be beaten by it. But the import ban may not only have scared the large 
importers. It probably also showed them the potential in trade and sanitary regulations 
for shaping the Russian market. This may have led them to seek influence on meat 
quotas, which they knew would most likely be unavoidable.  
The import ban meant that both business and state actors faced new demands: 
poultry businesses faced them in their markets, while state actors faced them within 
their responsibilities. And this most likely influenced them towards increased 
engagement with each other. 
Sector structure 
Is the organisational change in the industry a consequence of a change to its sector 
structure? Again, as discussed on pages 6 and 29, sector structure is a combination of 
the economic structure of the industry and the economic weight of the industry. Can 
one see the organisational change as influenced by changes in the economic structure 
of the industry, or by changes to the economic weight of the industry? I think not, 
because there were no substantial changes to the economic structure of the industry, or 
to the economic weight of the industry, in the period under study. The political 
importance of the industry grew, but the economic weight of the industry in the 
Russian economy in general remained unchanged. An expanded time frame would be 
needed to study the impact of more general changes in the sector structure.  
Bilateral relations 
Is the organisational change in the industry a consequence of a change in bilateral 
relations? Again, it will be remembered that bilateral relations are defined as official 
contacts between Russian and American government agencies; bilateral agreements, 
and Russian and American government acts and statements directly targeting the cases 
in the bilateral relationship. Can the organisational change be seen as a consequence of 
such changes? The discussion that opened this section concluded that it is. Here, I 
would like to emphasise that the opening of a new access channel for poultry importers 
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into state agencies followed the import ban. That the import ban served as a catalyst 
for both sides to pursue closer relations is confirmed by several sources. Other 
considerations may have played a part as well, and most likely did. The import ban 
was a change in bilateral relations because this regulation change specifically targeted 
importers of American poultry. What is remarkable is how soon it influenced the state-
business relationship in the case to change. 
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5  Concluding remarks 
5.1  Introduction 
In the preceding chapters, I analysed two cases of interaction between Russian state 
and business actors as they managed trade issues. In this chapter, I summarise the 
findings, and discuss their wider empirical and theoretical implications. The empirical 
findings are discussed first, and I begin with a summary of the steel and poultry 
networks. I then draw attention to four empirical findings. This is followed by a 
discussion of the theoretical implications of the empirical findings. First I discuss 
which of the models of state-business interaction were most useful. Then I discuss the 
influences of the two independent variables on the networks in the cases. Lastly, I 
argue that the network approach is a useful tool when approaching interest mediation 
in Russia. 
5.2  Main empirical findings: Privileged access in stable networks 
The empirical aim of this study was to describe how state and business actors 
interact in the two cases. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, Russia as a hybrid 
economy seems a more useful approach to the cases than that of a market economy. 
One assumption in this study has been that state-business interaction in Russia is not a 
process in which market mechanisms are prominent. This assumption was confirmed 
by the empirical findings. The patterns of interaction between state and business actors 
are briefly summarised below. I also discuss four empirical findings that characterise 
the system of interest mediation. I argue that this system can be called an insiders’ 
system, where access is privileged, and networks are stable. 
5.2.1  A brief summary of the steel network 
The steel network went through three phases in the period under study. From early 
1999 to mid-2000, it was partly closed, with low intensity and intermittent contact, low 
intensity in the relationship between state and business actors, and a low level of 
institutionalisation. In mid-2000, it changed to involve more frequent contact, and a 
higher level of institutionalisation. It acquired many functions, including cooperation 
and coordination, which imply a more intense relationship between state and business 
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actors. This lasted until the middle of 2002, when contact became less intense and the 
network lost some of its functions.  
The actor dimension is particularly interesting. In the period from early 1999 to 
mid-late 2001, membership was somewhat restricted. Only three large steel enterprises 
were included in making important decisions on the business side. During 2001, a 
fourth steel enterprise was included. In 2002, there were complaints about a lack of 
influence from a fifth steel enterprise, making it unclear how the membership would 
develop in the future. The inclusion of more business actors in the network will 
probably be reflected in the distribution of export quotas, as this seems to be one of the 
motivations for participation in the network.  
5.2.2  A brief summary of the poultry network 
In the poultry case, the network was more stable. It had many functions, and this 
implies intense relations between state and business actors. Membership was 
restricted. A new set of members with a new access channel entered the network in the 
summer of 2002. After this, the tendency towards restricted membership and closed 
boundaries was even clearer than it had been. Other essential features of the network, 
for example, considerable intensity, and delegation of public authority to business 
associations, were preserved and enhanced. The network was well institutionalised. 
There was a certain exchange of influence between the state and business sides. In this 
exchange, state actors influenced business’s access channels, while business actors 
influenced state policy and policy implementation in their market. One likely 
consequence in the Russian poultry market is a monopoly-like situation, when a cartel 
of major importers may have considerable control in the market.46   
5.2.3  Privileged access in stable networks  
The steel and poultry networks have some characteristics in common. There are 
four interesting findings that seem particular to this system of interest mediation.   
• A mixture of formality and informality in the networks; 
                                                 
46 But this is not state capture: If the poultry market in 2004-05 develops towards monopolisation and 
cartelisation, with extensive delegation of public authority to the Association of Operators on the Eurasian 
Poultry Market, this is because policy decisions in the Ministry of Agriculture made it possible.  
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• A remarkable stability. Still, the networks are responsive, and give the 
impression of a dynamic state-business relationship; 
• Interesting structural similarities between the networks in the two cases; 
• Lastly, in this system of interest mediation, business insiders have 
privileged access to state actors. 
Informality mixed with formality 
In common wisdom, a characteristic of Russian state-business contacts is that 
informal interaction is more important than formal interaction. This is also the 
expectation for the four models of state-business interaction used in this study (cf. 
table 2.1). The findings in this study modify this picture. Contacts between state and 
business actors in the cases were not only informal; there were important formal ties as 
well. The formal arenas were not only used for legitimation purposes, but 
supplemented informal contacts. In the steel case, informal and formal ties were both 
important; the informal (but very regular) contacts seemed to be more prominent than 
the formal ones. In the poultry case, formal ties and arenas for interest mediation 
mattered more in channelling access. When state and business actors needed to 
communicate better, the network was modified with a formal access channel.  
Dynamism and stability 
In both cases, interests were mediated in a rather stable way. The relative stability 
and predictability of the networks’ main characteristics do not indicate that this is a 
“chaotic social formation” (Lane 2000). Ties between the actors were not chaotic, or 
maintained on a case-by-case basis. In the steel case, some of the actors had been 
players in the steel business for a considerable period of time. And, as the president of 
SEMPR was happy to proclaim, at last there was now a “fully working corporative 
system” in the steel business (Afonin in Afonin and Pechik 2003 [interview]). In the 
poultry business, more of the actors were new to each other, but their aim seemed to be 
to develop a lasting system of relations. But while the networks were stable, they were 
open to changes. Network changes came as pragmatic responses to influences from 
outside the networks. When the networks responded to these influences, interaction 
could become more or less intense, take on more functions or lose some functions, or 
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include a new actor. However, these were restricted changes. The network structure 
would be modified to include a new function, or a new actor, but otherwise retained its 
previous features.  
Similarities between the cases 
The cases belong to quite different economic sectors. The ministries and agencies 
involved were different. The poultry industry was not very important in the Russian 
economy in the period under study: It consisted of many small businesses, although 
import businesses were rather large and powerful. The steel business had relatively 
few and important enterprises. As a sector, it was powerful. But the relations between 
state and business in the two cases were not that different at the end of the period 
under study. This regards the role of the business associations in particular. The state 
influenced business associations and business access channels to a considerable extent, 
but more in the poultry case than in the steel case. In both cases, however, the business 
associations were powerful, especially because public authority for import or export 
quota management was delegated to them. This made it possible for the business 
associations to control access to their members’ markets. In the poultry business, a 
likely consequence was a cartelisation of import to the Russian poultry market. In the 
steel case, it meant that access for new steel exporters to quota-regulated markets 
could be restricted through SEMPR. In spite of all the different details in the two 
cases, this is a striking similarity between them. 
Privileged access in the insiders’ system 
In some respects, one could call the networks an insiders’ system: Actors know 
each other. The other side of this is that business actors needed to work hard to gain 
access to state agents (Davleev 2003 [interview]), or to be included in the decision 
making channels that really mattered (cf. the complaints of Aleksei Ivanushkin and 
Mechel’s management about the preponderance of the four larger steel producers in 
steel export issues). In the poultry case, the main state agency seemed to pursue a 
strategy of active support of and changes in business associations. This points towards 
a system where access was privileged.47 Participation in the right channels brought 
benefits. Once inside, delegation of public authority, and influence on policies, were 
                                                 
47 I am grateful to Graeme Gill for allowing me to use his expression. 
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within reach for the active business actor. This was enhanced by state agents’ support 
for active business actors and business associations.  
In the insiders’ system, there seem to be very few channels for access between state 
actors and business actors. Within these channels, decisions and policies were 
discussed and made. Outside the state-business channels, influence was restricted to 
(feeble) public protest, like that of GMPR. With hard work and convincing action, one 
could gain access to channels of communication. This system of privileged access 
gave substantial influence to the ones inside. It can be interpreted as a cooptation of 
business interests into state structures, as argued by Graeme Gill (Gill 2004).  
5.3  Main findings as regards the models of state-business interaction 
Some models often used in studies of state-society relations in Russia may be more 
useful than others. One of the theoretical aims of this study was to discuss whether 
some of these models are better suited than others to describe state-business interaction 
in the cases. The findings are discussed here, and I lastly discuss how useful the 
models are when applied at the sector level. 
5.3.1  The poultry network and the models 
One could see the poultry network as an elite exchange network, but in my 
conclusion to chapter four (page 99), I suggest that sectoral corporatism could be a 
more useful model. In sectoral corporatism, state agencies meet business actors that 
are united in major interest associations with representational monopolies. State-
business networks take on many functions, and the structure is closed, with high 
intensity and stability. State and societal actors can be balanced in the network, and 
mutually dependent on each other, while both sides preserve a good measure of 
autonomy. Contacts are formal, consensus is sought, and crucially, state actors may 
actively support or change interest associations (van Waarden 1992:40). This is not a 
model elaborated in this study, but the findings in the poultry case indicate that it could 
be a useful model for other studies. 
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5.3.2  The steel network and the models 
The steel network changed from having some traits of a loose networking pattern, to 
having more in common with a clan from mid-2000 to mid-2002. Then the network 
changed again and once more became less clan-like. The changes were restricted to a 
few of the dimensions of the network. However, neither clans nor loose networking 
patterns provide a really good description of the network. The clan model, with all its 
shortcomings, is at one point closer to the steel network than the other models, but it is 
not close enough to be a good description of it.  
As suggested in the chapter on the steel case, it could be that the steel exporters’ 
business association, SEMPR, to some extent mediated mainly the interests of the 
three major steel producers. It would be interesting to analyse the steel network 
through other models, like sectoral corporatism, and investigate this further. This 
would require an even closer look at relations between all steel producers and SEMPR.  
5.3.3  The models: inadequate at the sector level but useful research tools? 
As shown above, none of the four models of state-business interaction fully reflects 
interest mediation in the cases studied here. However, that does not imply that they 
were not useful in the research. The models were used as ideal-types through which 
the empirical findings were analysed. Each model exposes some traits of a system of 
interest mediation, while placing less emphasis on other characteristics. This proved 
useful in the comparison between the two cases. It was possible to compare the 
models, because they had the dimensions of the network approach in common. The 
models made it easier to interpret the findings. 
Furthermore, it may be that the models are better suited to describe interest 
mediation at other levels of Russian politics. General models are often developed on 
the basis of studies of one level of politics, for example, at the highest level, and then 
used to approach state-business interaction at all levels. However, there may be 
considerable differences from state-business interaction on the overall level of the 
political economy to the specifics of a sector or a sub-sector. Even though the models 
were not particularly well suited at the sector level, this does not mean that they are 
useless in all studies of state-business interaction in Russia.  
 108 
 
5.4  Main findings as regards influences on the networks  
5.4.1  Network change 
The two cases differ as regards network change. The poultry network was enlarged 
in mid-2002 with a new channel for state-business interaction. Following this 
enlargement, the network featured more activity, and more intensity in the interaction 
between state and business actors. An organisational change in the industry, the 
creation of a new business association, influenced the network in this direction. The 
steel network became more intense and integrated in mid-2000, included a new actor 
in 2001, and lost some of its functions in mid-2002. 
5.4.2  Sector structure 
In the analysis of the poultry case, I concluded that there were no changes in the 
sector structure within the time frame of the study. Consequently, no conclusion can 
be drawn with regard to network influence in this case. In the steel case, the only 
sector structure change was the establishment of a new powerful actor, EvrazHolding. 
The new actor was gradually included in the network because the company had 
become too important in the steel sector to be overlooked. However, the inclusion of 
EvrazHolding in the network did not really lead to any changes in the network. 
Therefore, I conclude that the variable sector structure did not influence the networks 
in the cases studied here. 
5.4.3  Bilateral relations 
Both in the poultry case and in the steel case, bilateral relations were important for 
network change. In the poultry case, the import ban put increased demands on both 
state and business actors. The ban served as a catalyst for both the state and business 
side to open a new channel of communication between them. In the steel case, bilateral 
relations mattered when Russia was designated a market economy. The consequence 
was that the management of bilateral trade ties became organised in a different way, 
and the network became less intense in some respects as steel producers approached 
US authorities directly.  
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5.4.4  Internal sources of network change 
Lastly in this section, it is pertinent to distinguish internal sources of network 
change from external ones. In the steel case, the first network change, in mid-2000, 
seemed to be significantly influenced by the replacement of the old Ministry of Trade 
with the new MERT. Gradually the network became more intense, and contacts 
became more frequent, because the new government agency pursued a different 
strategy in the network. MERT was more active, and more accessible to business 
actors, than the Ministry of Trade had been. 
This change can be seen as a change in strategy from the public administration in 
the network. One state actor was replaced by another, and the new state agency 
pursued a different strategy towards the network. This change came from inside the 
network, and not from the outside. 
5.5  Implications for further study 
5.5.1  Influences on state-business networks 
One of the findings in this study is that relationships to another country matter in 
both the cases. This has implications for further studies of influences on state-business 
networks, and not only when this regards trade issues.  
An important point here is that the contexts of domestic networks are not 
necessarily only domestic. Networks formed to manage trade issues, like the steel and 
poultry networks, may be more susceptible to changes in foreign relations than other 
networks. But networks formed around other issues need not be isolated from 
international influence. Relations with other countries influence most policy areas, 
because international processes are developing in all policy areas. As more and more 
domestic issues acquire an international context, state and business actors will face 
new problems in many policy areas. The framework of this study can be useful in 
understanding their reactions, and how the relations between them are influenced in 
the process. That is why it is important to include the international context as an 
influence on domestic state-business relations. 
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5.5.2  The network framework revisited 
The network framework was chosen for this study because of its flexibility. Firstly, 
its dimensions allow for systematic analysis of the organisation of state-business 
interaction. Secondly, it is possible to include any number of external and internal 
influences on state-business interaction. One may explore influences on the networks 
in an open manner, which was an aim of the study. In rounding off the conclusion, I 
will concentrate on the first point, the systematic analysis of the organisation of state-
business interaction.  
The dimensions in the network framework make it possible to describe and analyse 
state-business interaction. The framework does not predict behaviour, and is not well 
suited for testing theory. However, for description and analysis it is a useful tool. One 
can study state-business interaction in societies in which it is unclear how it is 
organised, and the characteristics of the system for interest mediation are unclear, or 
disputed. This is because the network dimensions approach state-business interaction 
systematically. It becomes possible to compare this interaction across different sectors, 
and over time. In this way, one may come closer to an understanding of how the state 
and society meet. In today’s Russia, it is disputed how interests are mediated, and the 
processes of state-business interaction are not transparent. It is difficult to place these 
phenomena in existing categories for political and economic systems, like democracy, 
or a market economy. In a situation like this, analysis is easily reduced to describing 
what goes on, without a systematic approach. The network framework has provided a 
systematic and useful approach in this study. Through this framework, one acquires an 
understanding of how, and by whom, decisions are made.  
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Appendix  
Table A1  Imports to the United States from Russia, 1999-2002 
(Thousands of US dollars, customs value basis. Ranked by dollar value in 2002.) 
Producta 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Oil, mostly non-crude oil 522,498 827,598 873,265 2,004,908
Aluminium 1,162,015 1,286,028 685,858 1,064,425
Silver and platinum 1,442,237 2,255,882 1,497,398 508,840
Non-ferrous metals, excluding 
aluminium, including copper and 
nickel 
279,744 412,234 229,149 378,786
Iron and steelb 304,703 413,255 338,032 363,771
Clothing and accessories 131,015 260,593 333,542 358,591
Crustaceans, mostly crab 152,263 159,803 165,400 222,433
Plywood 75,441 88,935 103,899 129,966
Inorganic chemical elements, 
oxides, halogen salts 
47,453 78,299 97,760 88,946
Fertilizers 50,568 92,192 131,620 88,613
Pearls and precious stones, i.e., 
diamonds 
53,951 65,002 127,276 85,588
Alcoholic beverages (vodka) 79,816 72,437 95,665 80,570
Total trade, all items 5,805,001 7,796,434 6,261,301 6,824,944
 Source: US Census Bureau (2003) 
Table A2  Exports from the United States to Russia, 1999-2002 
(Thousands of US dollars. Ranked by dollar value in 2002.) 
Productc 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Non-bovine meat, mostly poultry 136,421 461,985 739,507 433,253
Civil engineering equipment 152,466 196,494 276,159 331,928
Radioactive materials, mostly 
uranium 
194 132,510 195,961 209,262
General machinery 124,491 148,435 170,800 190,924
Computers and equipment 71,417 92,132 112,422 117,043
Specialised machinery, including 
agriculture and food processing, 
excluding civil engineering 
equipment 
39,732 63,620 103,011 108,971
Measuring and medical equipment 60,443 66,764 100,353 108,917
Motor vehicles and equipment 40,014 44,475 62,235 82,184
Tobacco products 27,947 66,851 114,768 81,280
Aircraft 468,004 202,179 10,661 65,795
Telecommunications equipment 65,126 67,395 70,870 50,995
Baby toys and carriages 5,856 10,277 14,864 29,952
Total, all commodities 1,844,679 2,318,294 2,724,084 2,398,543
Source: US Census Bureau (2003) 
 
                                                 
a Selected items and customs groups. Radioactive material is excluded from the table. This is mostly uranium 
sent to the United States under a US-Russian agreement. 
b Excluding pig iron, iron and steel granules, powder, etc. 
c Selected items and customs groups. 
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Table A3  Production of crude steel 2002 
(Thousands of metric tonnes) 
Country Production of crude 
steel 2002  
China 181,688 
European Union 158,567 
Japan 107,745 
United States 92,241 
Russia 58,590 
South Korea 45,390 
Ukraine 34,056 
Source: International Iron and Steel Institute (2004) 
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Figure A1  Export of Russian iron and steel to the United States, 1999-2002 d
(By steel commodity group. Thousands of US dollars.)  
Source: US Census Bureau, (2003) 
                                                 
d Raw materials, like ore and powder, are excepted. 
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Figure A2  Poultry consumption in Russia 1990-2002 e
(Kilograms per person per year) 
Source: MSKh and Rosptitsesoiuz (2003:9). 
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Figure A3  American poultry export to Russia, 1991-2002 f  
 
(Thousands of US Dollars) 
Sources: For official numbers, US Census Bureau (2003) 
For estimated illegal import, Sparks (2002) 
                                                 
e Real numbers are believed to be higher, cf. Figure A3. 
f From 1996 to 2000, there was a substantial illegal poultry import to Russia of US chicken (Sparks 2002:8-10). 
In August 2000 new legislation and lower import tariffs led to a decrease in illegal import. Illegal import from 
August 2000 to 2003 is estimated to between 15 and 20 per cent of the total market.  
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